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SHELTON, DAVID E. The Legal Aspects of Male Students' Hair Grooming 
Policies in the Public Schools of the United States. (1980) 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 140. 
This study was made to examine court decisions from the judicial 
circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals concerning length of male 
students' hair in the public schools of the United States. The study 
identifies the constitutional provisions given by students supporting 
choice of hairstyle and the reasons given by local school boards for 
regulating the lengths of male students' hair. 
The study shows that the first, second, fourth, seventh, and eighth 
judicial circuits have established that choice of hairstyle is constitu­
tionally protected under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The third, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth circuits 
have supported school board claims that long hair on male students is 
unhealthy, unsanitary, and educationally disruptive. 
In addition, a review of the literature and an analysis of the 
legal proceedings of selected court cases identifies the following con­
clusions : 
(1) School boards and administrators are not immune from liability 
for money damages in cases involving infringement on consti­
tutional rights due to enforcement of hair dress codes. 
(2) School boards and administrators must be prepared to establish 
a need for its dress code. 
(3) School boards must be prepared to factually substantiate the 
contention that long hair creates a health and safety hazard. 
(4) School boards must be prepared to present factual evidence 
in support of their contention that long hair on male stu­
dents is educationally disruptive. As determined in Tinker 
the mere fear that the wearing of black armbands would re­
sult in disruption was insufficient to justify the school 
board's efforts to ban the wearing of symbols. Therefore, 
if evidence exists that long hair on males contributes to 
school disruption, it can only be used after the fact. 
(5) School boards must be able to justify claims that long hair 
on males creates discipline and morale problems. 
(6) Provisions for suspension or expulsion must be included 
provided this is punishment for violating the grooming code. 
(7) Hair grooming codes must be cooperatively developed with 
students, faculty, and parents. However, the sixth circuit 
has ruled contrary. 
(8) Hair grooming codes must be simple>but not too vague,and 
subject to revision with a provision for exceptions. 
(9) Judicial reasoning concerning long hair has established 
that no correlation exists between long hair and poor 
academic performance. 
(10) Division of the judicial circuits and the district courts 
therein concerning the long hair issue will stand until the 
Supreme Court of the United States makes a ruling. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Personal appearance has been a major area of conflict between young 
and old especially during the past decade. Nowhere has there been greater 
evidence of the generation gap than in the explosion of litigation concern­
ing long-haired males in public schools . Prior to 1969 only two cases 
had reached the federal courts; however, since then more than one hundred 
cases have been litigated. School authorities claim that controlling the 
length of hair is necessary to maintain order, discipline and an academic 
atmosphere. Students, on the other hand, maintain that choice of coiffure 
is an individual right protected by the Constitution of the United States. 
The Federal District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeal are 
without final direction since the United States Supreme Court has never 
decided an elementary or secondary school student's hair grooming case. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals supercedes the Federal District Courts in 
both authority and in the judicial appeals process. Thus, the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, one level below the Supreme Court, whose decisions are 
binding over all Federal District Courts in that geographical region, 
represents the supreme authority (See Figure 1) . 
The eleven Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Federal Dis­
trict Courts therein stand in disagreement on the issue. For instance, the 
third, fifth, sixth, ninth and tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have upheld 
school regulations controlling hair while the first, second, fourth, seventh 
and eighth circuits have viewed grooming as a constitutional right. 
United States 
Supreme Court 
A 
Court of Appeals 
A 
Federal District Courts 
1. Federal Court Structure 
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There has been a 49 percent increase in the number of lawsuits since 
1970; consequently, the judicial system has become a vehicle for redress of 
many filings unfair in life."'" Judicial barriers that have kept people out of 
the courts unless physically harmed have loosened. Some examples of 
judicial entanglements are: (1) the Supreme Court recently reviewed a 
case dealing with five George Washington University students' opposition 
to a railroad rate surcharge; (2) the Supreme Court stopped a $116 million 
hydroelectric project in Tennessee to save a three-inch fish, the snail 
o 
darter. Supreme Court judges have been roving in school desegregation, 
voting rights, mental health, the environment—the list seems endless. 
Although the hair issue has been very controversial, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to any case. The over­
all opinion of the Supreme Court was most appropriately surmised by the 
expressions of the late Justice Hugo Black sitting as circuit justice 
in a Texas case; 
All the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, are 
heavily burdened with important cases, the kind they must be 
able to handle if they are to perform their responsibility to 
society. Moreover, our constitution has sought to distribute 
the powers of government in this nation between the United States 
and the states. Surely the federal judiciary can perform no 
greater service to the nation than to leave the states unhampered 
in the performance of purely local affairs. Surely few policies 
can be thought of in which states are more capable of deciding 
than the length of hair of schoolboys.^ 
"*"Evan Thomas, "Have the Judges Done too Much," Time (January 22, 
1979), pp. 91-93. 
2Ibid. 
3j. Michael Brown, "Hair, the Constitution and Public Schools," 
Journal of Law and Education, 1., (July, 1972), 372. 
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Indeed the Constitution of the United States does not contain any 
provisions or references concerning education. Also, the Tenth Amendment 
ratified in 1791 includes "the powers not delegated to the United States 
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."^ Consequently, 
educators, students, and the general public assume that the federal 
government possesses little authority over public education. 
Many federal judges have removed themselves from student-school 
controversies as a result of a statement appearing in Epperson v. Arkansas: 
By and large, public education in our nation is committed 
to the control of states and local authorities. Courts do not 
and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise 
in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly 
and sharply implicate basic constitutional values. 
Moreover, many federal judges feel that professional educators who manage 
the schools are more familiar with problems emanating from the school 
system and are better suited to achieve resolution. At present judicial 
understanding of constitutional provisions as related to public education 
is varied as reflected by decisions of the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals 
in similar hair cases. These different rulings provide evidence that 
justice to some extent is how it is defined by federal court judges. 
Students' constitutional arguments concerning the validity of 
public school regulation of hairstyles are substantiated basically by 
provisions of the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
most successful argument refers to violation of substantive due process 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure. (Cincinnati, 
Ohio: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1968), p. 3. 
^Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. A California case, Meyers v. Areata, 
exemplifies this point.^ The dress code stated that extremes in hair 
styles would not be accepted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that the manner in which a student chose to wear his hair was a substantive 
freedom that could only be controlled by school authorities under limited 
conditions: 
. . . the regulations concerned must rationally relate to the 
enhancement of the educational function; the public benefits 
must outweigh the resulting impairment of the student's 
constitutional rights; there can be no alternatives less 
subversive of those rights. 
Judge Dorwin W. Suttle in Karr v. Schmidt ruled that hairstyle 
is an important factor in preserving concepts of individuality and per­
sonality. ® 
In a Pennsylvania case William Martin, a student, questioned the 
constitutionality of the school's grooming code. Martin was a musician 
in a rock band in which he earned fifty dollars per week. He insisted that 
9 
long hair, kept clean and neat, enhanced his audience appeal. The 
United States District Court ruled that enforcement of the dress code 
would deny Martin liberty and property without due process of law and 
thus would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In re Gault is a landmark Supreme Court case that established 
procedural due process rights of juveniles.^"® Although not dealing with 
^Meyers v. Areata Union High School District, 75 California 
Reporter 68 (ct.of Appeals, 2-10-1969, reh. denied 4-9-69). 
^Harold H. Punke, Social Implications of Lawsuits over Student 
Hairstyles, (Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1973), p. 148. 
®Karr v. Schmidt. 320 F. Supp. 728 (WD Texas, 1970). 
^Martin v. Davidson, 322 F. Supp. 318 (WD Pennsylvania, 1971). 
10ln re Gault. 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 
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hair, the case is significant to this study since it established.procedural 
due process considerations for school-age students. The judicial doctrine 
of Gault permeates hair cases. Moreover, the case established without a 
doubt the fact that juveniles have due process rights mandated under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Students also claim that hair regulations infringe on freedom of 
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Students argue that long 
hair is a protest to a cultural norm and consequently becomes "symbolic 
speech." The plaintiff in Richards v. Thurston^ insisted that long hair 
was a symbol of association with the younger generations that protest many 
norms of the older generation. Students maintain that long hair in this 
context is not unlike the wearing of armbands in TinkerAlthough Tinker, 
a landmark Supreme Court case, did not directly address the hair issue, 
it did force the provisions of substantive rights of students to the 
federal court level. 
1 3 In Griswold v. Connecticut the court combined the rulings in 
Breen v. Kahl^ and Dunham v. Pulsifer"*"^ to define a penumbra in which 
students' rights to control the length of hair is fundamental. The basis 
for this ruling was the First and Ninth Amendments. 
^Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
•^Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School District, 258 F. Supp. 
971 (1966). ~ 
•^Griswold v. Connecticut, 83 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). 
l4Breen v. Kahl, 398 US 937 (1970). 
•^Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (1970). 
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Students have also questioned the constitutionality of hair style 
regulations on the grounds of denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The equal protection issue is whether school officials sustained 
the same objections to long hair worn by women students. Sex-role stereotyping 
established in school policies by school administrators indicates the answer 
to be "no". Therefore, is the issue really length of hair or a more basic 
understanding of sex roles? The rulings in Griffin v. Tatum^ indicate 
that objections to a particular behavior must be applicable to both sexes 
in order to endure under constitutional scrutiny. 
School administrators, on the other hand, have been successful in 
claiming the right to wear long hair is not constitutionally protected. This 
success is based on the number of federal judges that have overruled the 
rights of students in the interest of the state. School administrators' 
most successful argument has been disruption of the educational process. 
The disruption theory developed by the Supreme Court in Tinker maintained 
that while students do "not shed their constitutional right at the school 
house gate", school regulations that violate constitutional rights would 
be sustained if school administrators could establish "a showing that 
students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work 
and discipline of the school.The burden of proof lies on school officials 
to determine what type of appearance is disruptive. 
In the early seventies many student situations were determined by 
the federal courts to be disruptive. Fears of harassment, threats by 
^Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60-61. (MD Alabama 1969). 
"^Brown, op..cit., p. 578. 
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fellow classmates , and anticipated disruptions provide examples. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the hair regulation justified 
where long hair caused a "diverting influence on the student body."^® 
Approaching the mid-1970's, however, the federal courts placed 
less emphasis on the disruption theory. Proof was sought that appropriate 
disciplinary measures had been incorporated to control disruptions rather 
than enforcing a haircut regulation. This view was apparent in Turley v. 
Adel^ with the exegesis that a "classroom disturbance that can be con­
trolled through normal disciplinary procedures should not be allowed to 
pass for material and substantial disruption. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The eleven Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Federal 
District Courts therein stand in disagreement on the issue. Federal 
District Courts are confused as to direction since there is no United 
States Supreme Court decision. Justice William Douglas in Ferrell v. 
Dallas Independent School District stated: 
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states 
are restrained by an equal protection clause, a person can be 
denied edjj^ation in a public school because of the length of 
his hair. 
^Westley v. Rossi. 305 F. Supp. 706 (1969). 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 US 856 (1968). 
^Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County Georgia, 400 
US 957 (1970). 
^Turley v. Adel Community School District, 322 F. Supp. 402 (1971). 
22 Brown, op. cit., p. 578. 
23 
Ferrell v. Dallas, loc. cit. 
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The majority of Supreme Court judges do not feel that the hair 
issue warrants review by the nation's highest court. Consequently, school 
officials are confused on the problem. This is an historical study of 
the legal aspects as decided by the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals 
of the United States concerning length of male students' hair in public 
schools of the United States. The research is concerned with: (1) the 
attempts of administrators to control hair-growing practices; (2) the 
extent to which school board policies and practices are being challenged 
and litigated; (3) the judicial reasoning concerning these challenges; (4) the 
results of major court cases concerning school board hair grooming policies; 
and (5) the influence that judicial decisions have on the formulation of 
dress code policies in public schools. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Historically personal appearance has been a major area of conflict 
between young and old. More significant, however, is the struggle between 
male students and school administrators, school dress codes, and/or school 
board policies concerning length of male students' hair. More than 
one hundred haircut cases have been litigated since 1968. Furthermore 
what complicates the issue is that the United States Supreme Court has 
never decided a student haircut case. This leaves Circuit Courts of Appeals 
decisions on both sides of the issue standing—decisions supporting plaintiff 
students and decisions supporting school board policies and school dress codes. 
It, therefore, depends on what geographical area students live in whether 
or not they will be successful before a judicial tribunal. A Supreme 
Court decision is badly needed to settle the issue between conflicting 
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judicial decisions; however, apparently no such decision is forthcoming 
in the immediate future. Thus, the eleven circuits' jurisdictions are 
supreme within their own area. 
This study is significant in that an analysis of the rulings in 
the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals will provide: (1) a concise and 
complete reference to the legality of attempting to control the length 
of hair and of the constitutional rights of students to exhibit the coif­
fure of their choice; (2) basic guidelines for administrators to observe 
when developing dress codes since the legal principles relating to the 
discretionary control of hair styles as decided by the courts is appli­
cable to almost every phase of pupil appearance. Decision makers must 
deal with the precedents established in the major court cases. This 
study will provide a convenient reference to these precedents. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study will be divided into five chapters. Chapter I will 
be an introductory chapter containing the statement of the problem, the 
significance of the study, the organization of the study, the procedures 
of the research, and the definition of terms utilized in the research. 
Chapter II will contain a review of the literature on students' 
rights that is related to the hair sector of personal appearance. This 
will provide a brief history of the developments which have contributed 
to social entanglements that have depended on litigation for resolution. 
Chapter III will enlarge upon the legal aspects of male students' 
hair-grooming policies in the public schools of the United States. 
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Chapter IV will present an analysis of selected major judicial 
decisions from the eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals. 
Chapter V will present a summary and conclusions drawn from infor­
mation in the preceding chapters. 
PROCEDURES OF RESEARCH 
The basic research technique of this historical study will be to 
examine the available primary and secondary sources. Federal and state 
court records found in the American Digest System, the National Reporter 
System and the United States Reports will be the major primary references. 
Secondary references will include books related to the principles of school 
law and journal articles concerned with the legal and social aspects of 
personal appearance in the public schools of the United States. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Appellant; The party who takes an appeal from one court to 
another. 
Appellee: The party against whom an appeal is taken. 
Concurring opinion; An opinion written by a judge who agrees 
with the majority of the court as to the decision in a case, but has 
different reasons for arriving at that decision. 
Defendant: The party against whom relief or recovery is sought. 
Disruption; Any event which significantly interrupts the education 
of students. 
Dissenting opinion; The opinion in which a judge announces his 
dissent from the conclusions of the majority of the court. 
12 
Due process: Following established rules that protect individual 
rights. Procedural issues involve questions of structure and process 
used to determine discipline and establish rules. Substantive issues 
are involved with the reasons behind the rules or the details of the 
discipline. 
Injunction: A court order restraining or prohibiting a defendant 
from doing a certain thing or commanding that a certain thing be done. 
In loco parentis: (Latin for "in place of the parent") Being 
charged with some of the responsibilities of the parent. 
Litigation: The act or process of carrying on a lawsuit. 
Penumbra; Marginal or unclear. 
Plaintiff: One who commences a suit in a court of law. 
Precedent: A judicial decision or a form of proceeding that serves 
as a rule for future determinations in similar cases. 
Writ of certiorari: (Latin for "to be informed of something") 
An order from a higher court to a lower court requesting that the entire 
record of a case be sent up for review by the higher court. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries schools pro­
vided young people the opportunity to acquire knowledge and develop skills 
necessary for survival in an America dominated by frontier influence. 
The schooling process was recognized as an equalizer which allowed child­
ren of the poor and uneducated an opportunity to climb the socio-economic 
ladder.^ Consequently, students accepted the subservient role for they 
viewed the purpose of education as very beneficial. 
Since early schools in America were private schools, there were 
few statutes and court cases directly related to schools. A legal frame­
work about schools began to develop only when schools became public. At 
this early stage, however, most laws relating to education were concerned 
with the operation of schools with little reference to students. 
EVOLUTION OF COURT INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION2 
Generally, five stages in the evolutionary process of court involve­
ment in education are discernible. 
1. The stage of strict judicial laissez faire. 
2. The stage of state control of education. 
3. The reformation stage. 
^Joseph M. Nygaard, The Counselor and Students Legal Rights, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 2. 
o 
John C. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Interest, 
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), p. 6. 
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4. The stage of education under supervision of the courts. 
5. The stage of strict construction.3 
The period of time from 1789 to 1850 has been described as the 
stage of strict judicial laissez faire since the federal and state courts 
practically ignored education.^ Several factors contributed to this 
judicial trend. In the United States the earliest schools were established 
in small towns since town governments could provide better facilities. 
The establishment of schools outside of towns was difficult since country 
settlements were sparsely populated. Also, the United States Constitution 
did not address education and the Tenth Amendment, adopted in 1791, rel­
egated to the states matters of education. Consequently, federal courts 
viewed education as a local matter and seldom did state courts become 
involved in schools. Therefore, judicially this was a period of minimal 
involvement in education. 
From 1850 to about 1950 state courts asserted that education was 
exclusively a state and local matter.This period has been described as 
the stage of state control of education. Few cases related to education 
came before the Supreme Court of the United States during this period. 
Consequently, a body of case law developed at the state level that allowed 
educational policies and practices which infringed on the constitutional 
rights of students.^ For example, in 1923 the Arkansas Supreme Court in 
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer^ ruled that the school had a right to forbid 
3IDid. 4Ibid., p. 5. 
5Ibid. 6Ibid. 
7pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). 
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any style of dress tending toward immodesty. In this case immodest dress 
included the wearing of transparent hoisery, low-necked dresses, and cos-
meticsr The court ruled that local administrators were more familiar 
with the issue and better suited to determine whether the rule was rea­
sonable . 
In 1934, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Antel v. Stokes8 
ruled in favor of school officials in prohibiting the wearing of jerseys 
and caps of a secret club on school premises. The court felt that the 
ruling was within the power granted local administrators by the state leg­
islature . 
In 1947 the Supreme Court of Georgia in Matheson v. Brady^ upheld 
the decision of a principal who would not allow a female student to attend 
classes while wearing slacks. 
Near the middle of the twentieth century federal courts began to 
recognize that educational policies and practices that had developed 
from state laws and state court decisions were inconsistent with federal 
constitutional requirements. 1̂ This awareness at the federal level 
marked the beginning of the reformation stage. Before 1950 only twenty-
five cases related to the public schools were reviewed by the Supreme 
Court. Three decisions were rendered during the century, 1778-1888, and 
twenty-two more during the period 1889-1948.^"* 
8Antel v. Stokes, 287 Mass. 103, 191 N.E. 407 (1934). 
^Matheson v. Brady, 202 Ga. 500 43 S.E. 2d 703 (1947). 
10Hogan, p. 4. 
•^Edward C. Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on Public 
School Issues, (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1973), p.7. 
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Judicial Influence 
Federal and state courts began to expand their powers over schools 
by intervening in matters affecting the organization and administration. 
During the reformation stage these activities of the federal and state 
12 
courts ushered in the stage of education under supervision of the courts. 
Before this time, however, the Supreme Court maintained the traditional 
position of reluctance to interfere in school matters related to rights 
and responsibilities of students. Belief in the American tradition of 
local control over schools represented the major reason. Also, in Epperson 
1 O 
v. Arkansas the Supreme Court stated: 
Public education in our nation is committed to the control of state 
and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the 
resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school 
systems. 
However, the abridgement of constitutional rights of students by 
local officials precipitated increased involvement in educational matters 
by the Supreme Court. This judicial trend began with the landmark deseg­
regation decision rendered in Brown v. Board of Education.^ In this 
decision the Supreme Court established that "today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local government.This type 
of judicial thought set the mold for several landmark decisions which 
established the legal entitlement of all children to be included in public 
schools. 
12 Hogan, p. 6. 
13 
Epperson v. Arkansas, U.S. 97 (1968). 
14 Perry A. Zirkel, A Digest of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Education, (Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1978), p. 32. 
l^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
l6Hogan, p. 6. 
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A major concern at this time was the Supreme Court adherence to 
the commands of the Constitution. Felix Frankfurter, former Supreme 
Court Justice said: 
Humility, painstaking solicitude for the ascertainable feelings 
and needs of present day society, the imaginative effort to re­
concile contending claims, respect for the spontanity and per­
sistence with which groups are established to conserve a social 
interest—these are the high qualitites of discernment, of tol­
erance, of wise statecraft without which constitutional law is 
a system of pernicious abstractions instead of the governance 
of a teeming continent 
This type of consistency with the provisions of the Constitution 
is descriptive of the intentions of the period known as the stage of 
• I  Q  
strict construction.±a 
Beginning in 1973 with the school finance case, Rodriguez v. San 
Antonio Independent School District^,and continuing to the present, the 
posture of federal courts has been not only to decide more cases affecting 
education,but when issuing mandates, orders, and decrees, to retain 
jurisdiction over the cases to insure implementation. 
Supreme Court Decisions Affecting 
Students' Rights 
In early cases concerning students 1 rights the Supreme Court gave 
deference to local control. For example, in 1905 in Jacobson v. Massa-
20 
chusetts, the Supreme Court upheld the interest of the local government 
"^Philip B. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren 
Court, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. xv. 
C. Hudgins , Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education; 
Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions, (Charlottesville, Virginia: 
The Michie Company, 1979), p. 16. 
•^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. 
Supp. 280 (1971). 
^Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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in protecting health under challenges of Fourteenth Amendment protection 
by students. In this 1905 case Cambridge, Massachusetts health officials 
instituted a program of mandatory vaccination of all students in an 
attempt to reduce the incidence of smallpox within the city. A Cambridge 
resident sought to have the program declared unconstitutional; however, 
the Supreme Court held that a law requiring mandatory vaccination in 
order to protect health is constitutional. A similar ruling concerning 
21 protection of public health occurred in a 1922 case, Zucht v. King. 
In 1943, the Supreme Court issued opinions in two cases concerning 
22 flag saluting. In Taylor v. Mississippi and West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette,2̂  the Supreme Court held that the passive refusal 
to salute the flag did not create a danger to the state to the extent 
that First Amendment rights may be impaired. These two cases indicated 
a change in the judicial attitude toward students' rights, although the 
Supreme Court did not decide another students' rights case until 1967. 
In re Gault24 in 1967 the Supreme Court held that due process 
rights must be afforded to juveniles. Although this was a nonschool case, 
it renewed Supreme Court interest in the rights and responsibilities of 
students for in the next ten years, nine cases in this area were litigated. 
25 In re Gault. a fifteen-year-old boy was taken into custody after 
a complaint that he had made an obscene phone call. At the hearing, Gault 
was not represented by legal counsel nor was he allowed to confront the 
21Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
22Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). 
2%est Virginia State Board of Education v, Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). 
24In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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complaining witness. The juvenile court sentenced hi® to a maximum 
of six years in a state school for juvenile delinquents. An adult, 
found" guilty of the same crime, would have received a maximum penalty 
of two months imprisonment and a fifty-dollar fine. Gault's parents 
challenged the validity of the juvenile court statute which allowed a 
child to be incarcerated yet denied him basic constitutional rights. 
The Supreme Court held that when court proceedings could result 
in a minor's incarceration in an institution, the following constitutional 
guidelines must be followed: 
1. Timely and adequate written notice of the charges must be 
given to the minor and his parents or guardian. 
2. Parents or guardians and the child must be informed of their 
rights to legal counsel. 
3. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is 
applicable. 
4. Absent a valid confession a child has a right to cross-examine 
2 c. 
hostile witnesses and to present his own witnesses. 
The basis for this ruling was that the Fifth Amendment creates a 
right against self-incrimination while the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
people from state action infringing on life, liberty, or property with­
out due process of law. These amendments are applicable to those under 
as well as those over the age of eighteen. This case established without 
a doubt that juveniles have the constitutional rights of procedural due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
26Ibid. 
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27 In re Winship the United States Supreme Court reversed the New 
York Court of Appeals on the question of whether proof beyond a reason­
able doubt is part of due process required during the adjudicatory stage 
in juvenile court proceedings. The Supreme Court established that this 
type of proof has been a part of criminal proceedings since the founding 
of the nation. 
The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American 
scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for re­
ducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.2® 
The Supreme Court quoted Gault: 
Observance of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will 
not compel the states to abandon or displace any of the substan­
tive benefits of the juvenile process. 
Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District^ was 
the first Supreme Court ruling on the substantive rights of students. In 
this 1969 case three public school pupils were suspended for wearing black 
arm bands to class in protest of the Vietnam war. There was no substan­
tial interference in the educational process as a result of the students' 
conduct. School authorities did not prohibit the wearing of other sym­
bols with political significance; therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that 
school officials were interested in suppressing an opinion concerning the 
Vietnam war. The students sought a court order prohibiting school author­
ities from disciplining them and declaring the suspensions unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court held that the wearing of arm bands is an ex-
ression of opinion entitled to First Amendment protection. School officials 
27In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
28Ibid. 29Ibid. 
o n  
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969). 
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might constitutionally infringe on First Amendment rights only if the ex­
pression created substantial education disruption. Mere anticipation 
of disruption did not justify infringement. Influential in the Tinker 
opinion was Burnside v. Byars^l which emphasized that school officials 
could not make rules or regulations infringing on the right to free 
expression unless there were absolute proof of educational disruption. 
Gault and Tinker have had consistent influence on subsequent 
cases. The Gault decision has been more influential since it specifically 
delineated procedural rights , while Tinker merely raised the issue of sub­
stantive rights without dictating decisive action to be taken. Neverthe­
less, these cases forced the issue of due process rights of students to 
the Supreme Court level. 
The rulings in Police Department v. Mosley,^ Grayned v. City of 
Rockford,"^ Healy v. James^ and Papish v. Board of Curators ,35 followed 
the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Tinker by upholding 
various substantive First Amendment rights. Respectively, these include 
the right to picket, the right of association, freedom of speech, and 
freedom of the press. 
In 1975 in Goss v. Lopez^ the Supreme Court broadened the pro­
cedural rights of students faced with short-term suspensions by requiring 
"^Bumside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
•^Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
"^Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
•^Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
35papish V- Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
^Goss y. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to suspension. The Ohio pub­
lic school law gave the principal power to suspend students for up to ten 
days without notice or hearing. Nine students who were suspended challenged 
the constitutionality of the statutes involved. They sought action re­
straining school officials from issuing suspensions and requiring these 
officials to remove references to past suspensions from their records. 
The Supreme Court held that the statutes were unconstitutional. 
The ruling also included the provision that students who are suspended for 
ten days must be provided the following before suspension; 
1. Oral or written notice of the charges, 
2. An explanation of the evidence if the student denies the 
charges, 
3. Some kind of hearing that includes an opportunity to present 
the student's view of the incident 
These procedures are required by the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits 
the states from impeding, impinging upon life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. 
The Supreme Court further strengthened the procedural rights of 
students in Wood v. Strickland.^8 xn this case, which shortly followed 
Goss, the Supreme Court held that a school official is not immune from lia­
bility for money damages in cases involving the infringement of constitutional 
rights of students. In this case three high school students were expelled 
because they put malt liquor in the punch served at an extracurricular 
38Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
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meeting at the school. The students and their parents brought suit under 
a federal statute which provides that any person who, under state law, 
deprives another of constitutional rights secured by federal law, shall 
be liable for money damages or for other relief. The students sought 
money damages from two school officials and the school board. 
The Supreme Court held that a school official's immunity from 
liability for money damages depends on two elements: 
1. The official must perform with the sincere belief that he 
is correct in his actions. 
2. He must show no malicious intent to deprive constitutional 
rights of the students.^9 
The decisions in these cases provided for the strengthening of pro­
cedural rights of students under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
FORCES CONTRIBUTING TO STUDENTS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
Approximately 40,000 court cases affecting the organization and 
administration of schools were decided between 1789 and 1971.^ (Table 1) 
Furthermore, from 1971 through 1979 more than 6,200 federal and state 
court cases were reported in the Yearbook of School Law which includes all 
cases relevant to public school education reported in West's General Di­
gest . There was a sharp increase in cases beginning in 1956 due in large 
part to attempts by the courts to implement the mandates of the landmark 
39Ibid. 
^°Hogan, p. 6. 
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TABLE 1 
State and Federal Court Cases Which Have Affected the 
Organization, Administration, and Programs 
of the Schools (1789-1971)41 
Periods 
1789-1896 
1897-1906 
1907-1916 
1916-1926 
1926-1936 
1936-1946 
1946-1956 
1956-1966 
1967-1971 
Total 
Cases 
3,096 
2,304 
3,060 
4,464 
6,324 
5,544 
7,203 
4,420 
3,510 
39,925 
State Court 
Cases 
3,046 
2,289 
3,038 
4,420 
6,257 
5,456 
7,091 
3,691 
2,237 
37,125 
Federal Court 
Cases 
50 
15 
22 
44 
67 
88 
112 
729 
1,273 
2,800 
^Hogan, p. 7. 
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A2 Brown decision. The sharp increase in cases beginning in 1967 can be 
attributed to the number of times federal courts decided on the abridge­
ment of" constitutional rights of students. Personal appearance represented 
the focus in the majority of students' rights cases of the late sixties 
and seventies. More than one hundred cases have been litigated concerning 
long hair on male students in the public schools. 
The forces contributing to the development of students ' rights 
are varied. They represent historical and contemporary considerations, 
psychological and sociological considerations, as well as philosophical, 
and legal considerations. The following have been identified as signifi­
cant forces in the area of students' rights: 
1. the changing role of the child within the family structure; 
2. the changing role of the school in a highly bureaucratized, 
industrial, technological society; 
3. the growing interest of the state in a redefinition of child­
hood and adolescence based on the increasing interest of the state in 
talent, achievement, and international competition; and 
4. the growing political power of youth in America stemming in 
large part, from the length and extent of the Vietnam war as well as the 
struggle for civil rights. 
The United States presents a favorable geographical atmos­
phere for youth to engage in exploration. A wide variety of terrain, 
climate and natural resources affords considerable room for new 
42Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. 
Ed. 873 (19547: 
^Vernon F. Haubrich and Michael W. Apple, Schooling and the Rights 
of Children, (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Company, 1975), 
p. vii. 
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ideas to be examined. The examination has been more extensive in some 
areas of human experience than in others ; students• rights represents 
an area of human experience in which great pressure has been placed on 
the social melieu in an attempt to create an environment that is asympto­
tically constitutional. Also, during the late 1960's and early 1970's 
there was a marked increase in the number of people fifteen to twenty-two 
years of age.44 Consequently, the proportion of youth compared to the 
total population was greater during this time. Whatever activity the 
people of this age group chose to participate in substantially influenced 
cultural outlook because of the vast number of persons involved. 
Conflict of generations has been identified as a distinctive char­
acteristic of student movements. Feuer defines student movement as 
. . .  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  s t u d e n t s  i n s p i r e d  b y  a i m s  w h i c h  t h e y  t r y  
to explicate in a political idealogy, and moved by emotional re­
bellion in which there is always present a dissillusionment with 
and rejection of the values of the older generation. 
To Plato, generational struggle represented the basic mechanism in political 
change. Plato believed that every form of government seemed to breed its 
46 own distinctive form of generational contradiction. 
Aristotle felt that generational conflict stemmed from the character 
of the generation. The young, he wrote, 
. . . love honor and victory more than they love money, which indeed 
they love very little, not having yet learned what it means to be 
without it... . They have exalted notions, because they have not 
yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations; more­
over, their hopeful dispositions make them think themselves equal 
to great things—and that means having exalted notions.47 
44Harold H. Punke, Social Implications of Lawsuits over Student 
Hairstyles, (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 
Inc., 1973), p. 11. 
4"*Lewis S. Feuer, The Conflict of Generations, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1969), p. 11. 
46Ibid., p. 28 47Ibid., p. 29. 
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To the early Egyptian and Hebrew sages wisdom in purpose was a 
warning against generational pride and rebellion.4® From early Egyptian 
to modern times there has been dissent by youth emanating from disen­
chantment in the manner in which elders operate national and local affairs. 
Youth has been concerned for some time about their place in the society 
and their rights which accompany this role. 
In the 1960's, movements by students to achieve constitutional 
rights originated from matters of national and international concern. 
Students seeking to express their views on the Vietnam war, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and dress and appearance have been denied this opportun­
ity by school authorities. The result has been suspension or threat of 
suspension. 
Both Tinker v. Independent School District4̂  amj Butts v. Dallas 
Independent School District-^ resulted from protesting the Vietnam war 
by the wearing of black armbands. The civil rights movement prompted the 
wearing of buttons which resulted in litigation in both Burnside v. Byars^ 
and Blackwell v. Issaquena Board of Education.An avalanche of litiga­
tion has resulted from disputes concerning dress and appearance. 
Students, realizing that the American ideal of freedom and liberty 
of the individual had not been extended to the student population, began 
to speak out, thus threatening the political establishment and institutions 
of society. John Stuart Mill, a great British writer of the nineteenth 
48Ibid., p. 30. 
^Tinker v. Independent School District, 258 F. Supp. 971 (1966). 
~^Butts v. Dallas Independent School District, 306 F. Supp. 1309 (1970). 
"^Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744 (1966). 
"^Blackwell v. Issaquena Board of Education, 363 F. 2d 749 (1966). 
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century, wrote: 
If all mankind were of one opinion, and only one person were of 
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silenc­
ing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be jus­
tified in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a personal possession 
of no value except to the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoy­
ment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference 
whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. 
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, 
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than 
those who hold it. If the opinion is right they are deprived of 
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, 
what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. 
Underground newspapers, sexual freedom, and censorship represent 
additional areas of student revolt that resulted in sit-ins, walk-outs, 
and other forms of protest. 
The counterculture influence and the popularity of rock music 
groups influenced the dress and grooming habits of youth in the 1960's. 
The most popular style of dress for students included jeans, sweatshirts, 
beads, mustaches, beards and long hair, much to the dismay of the older 
generation. 
Students increasingly challenged the constitutionality of dress 
and grooming codes. As a result, long hair on males became the most con­
troversial issue of appearance in the federal courts as students sought 
constitutional rights and administrators sought an orderly educational 
process. 
53john Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Etc., (England: Oxford University 
Press, 1912), pp. 23-24. 
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HISTORICAL VIEWS ON HAIR 
History contains several examples of governments that have si­
lenced their opponents by requiring conformity to hair styles or dress 
codes. In 1644 the Ching dynasty attempted to consolidate its power 
by forcing the male population "to shave the front of the head, and to 
wear the hair in a queue.The opposition to such requirements was so 
intense that many chose to die "rather than adopt the marks of servitude. 
Another example was the official prohibition of beards during the reign 
of Peter the Great.Also, the present military structure of the United 
States dictates that new recruits be shorn in a manner that closely approxi­
mates a clean shaven head. 
Hair styles have altered from time to time throughout the ages. 
Sampson's locks symbolized his virility. Many of the founding fathers 
of the United States wore wigs. Abraham Lincoln grew a beard at the 
suggestion of a juvenile female admirer. General Robert E. Lee and Gen­
eral Ulysses S. Grant wore long hair. Although there exists no depiction 
of Jesus Christ, He has always been drawn with hair of at least shoulder 
length. 
School officials have been making and enforcing dress codes against 
nonconforming students for hundreds of years. In 1560, the Cambridge Uni­
versity in England "fined a student six schillings and eight pence for 
breaking a school rule that 'no scholler doe weare any long lockes of 
54 
David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of Students , 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 179. 
55Ibid., p. 179. 
Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1264 (1970). 
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of hayre uppon his heade, but that he be polled, notted, or rounded after 
the accustomed manner of the gravest Schollers of the Universitie."'57 
In America, controversies over hair length have been taking place 
at least since 1649 when the magistrates of Portsmouth issued the follow­
ing regulation: 
For as much as the wearing of long hair, after the manner of 
ruffians and barbarous Indians, has begun to invade New England, 
we, the magistrates, do declare and manifest our dislike and 
detestation against the wearing of such long hair, as against 
a thing uncivil and unmanly, whereby men do deform themselves 
and do corrupt good manners.58 
Although hairstyles have been a form of personal identity since 
the ancient Greekst conformity to societal norms concerning hairstyles 
has gradually occurred. This conformity, however, is less likely when a 
society attempts to maximize personal freedom. This maximization of per­
sonal freedom is a goal that is basically accepted by the American relation­
ships between personal freedom and group well-being. 
Students have viewed imposed dress and grooming standards as an 
infringement on constitutional rights while as a group, school administrators 
have been reluctant to surrender to societally imposed obligation to enforce 
traditional standards. The result has been extensive litigation. 
At the outset of the twentieth century the American society began 
to realize a need for procedures of juvenile justice that were separate 
from those applied to adults. The first American juvenile court was 
opened in Cook County, Illinois in 1889 by Jane Addams and a concerned 
group of individuals who recognized this need for separation.59 
57schimmel and Fischer, The Civil Rights of Students, p. 177. 
58Ibid. , p. 178 
59vernon F. Haubrich and Michael W. Apple, Schooling and the Rights 
of Children, (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), 
p. 132. 
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The court attempted to perform the role of a substitute parent, 
a role that had, until this time, been performed by the school system 
under fhe doctrine of in loco parentis. The good intentions of in loco 
parentis, however, soon developed into a system of laws and regulations 
that denied youth basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This 
denial rontinued until the mid-twentieth century. 
Berkley's Free Speech Movement beginning in the early 1960's 
allowed the fight for student rights to gravitate into the elementary 
and secondary school systems. The court system of the United States 
was eventually called upon to settle disputes between students and school 
authorities. Two levels of disagreements represented these disputes. 
Students questioned the basic methods used by school officials in forming 
policies and deciding on forms of discipline. Secondly, students questioned 
the legal right of school authorities to make rules that curbed individual 
freedoms . ̂  
These two arguments legally identified procedural and substantive due 
process as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Later 
the landmark Supreme Court cases Gault and Tinker respectively set pre­
cedents concerning the procedural and substantive rights of students. 
Several studies have been conducted relating to legal decisions 
which regulate the authority of administrators to control students. Vir­
ginia Flowers concluded in her 1963 study of the legal aspects of pupil 
control: 
. . . that in each of the states may be found constitutional pro­
visions for educating the youth of the state, but attendance in 
the public schools is not a guaranteed right to be exercised above 
all other considerations; rather it is a privilege which may be 
60Ibid., p. 133 6lIbid. 
32 
claimed by those young people who are willing to comply with 
the provisions of the constitution and statutes of the 
state. . ,62 
Narciso Gamberoni in 1960 completed a study of the decisions of 
the Courts of Appeals from 1900 to 1960 concerning the authority of school 
boards to establish rules for pupil behavior. In an attempt to define 
a pattern in such regulation, Gamberoni found that while a court decision 
in a particular state declares the law for that state it does not estab­
lish authority ir. another state.^ He also found that when a court found 
no precedent on a particular case, often cases from another state were 
cited for support. Gamberoni concluded that this enabled the courts to 
rule on similar topics that arose in different states. 
During the mid-sixties school officials extensively exercised 
their authority to control pupil appearance. At Oyster Bay High School in 
New York principal Richard Nodell confined five male students with long 
hair to a separate classroom after they refused to get a haircut.^ After 
six days of isolation the students visited a hairstylist for modifications. 
In 1968 the principal of a Norwalk, Connecticut high school suspended 
fifty-three students after they refused to get a haircut.^ 
^^Harry C. Mallios, A Study of Legal Opinions Pertaining to Control 
of Pupil Dress and Appearance—1960-1969, (University of Miami, Coral 
Gables, Florida, 1970), p. 18. 
63Ibid. , p. 20. 
^"Hair-do's—and Don'ts." Newsweek, Vol. 68, October 3, 1966, p. 94. 
^"Talk of the Town," New Yorker, Vol. 43, Feb. 17, 1968, pp. 24-25. 
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In 1966 at Bloomfield Hills High School in Detroit more than 150 
students walked out in protest after school officials refused admission 
to sevSral students with long hair. 
Students began to feel that school officials were not reasonable 
in the exercise of authority. Parents of affected students also voiced 
their concern. Paul Good, father of a boy who was suspended from the 
Norwalk, Connecticut school system in 1968, reflected the feelings of 
many parents with the following statement: 
In an unstable time of changing political, social, and sexual 
pressures, hair becomes a symbol to young people. By shearing 
it the school officials would like to cut off rebellion ... 
Young men like my son learn a dangerous lesson about our society 
when tyrannical majorities will not tolerate minority diversity, 
be the issue hair, race, or politics 
These conflicts between students and school officials concerning 
hair set the stage for court activity that is unprecedented in any area 
of human rights. 
COURT INVOLVEMENT 
The first case on record concerning long hair on male students is 
Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro.^ In this 1965 first circuit 
case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled that school officials had 
the right to order a student to get his hair cut. The student, George 
Leonard, Jr., was a well-behaved, conscientious, and properly attired 
^"Hair-do's—and Don'ts," p. 44. 
^"Have Schools the Right to Enforce Haircuts," Good Housekeeping, 
Vol. 159, (September, 1968), p. 16. 
^Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 212 N.E. 2nd 468 
(Mass . 1965) . ~~ 
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individual who claimed that long hair was essential'for his activities 
as a musician. The student's parents claimed that school officials 
could"not bar their son from classes simply because of his long hair. 
They felt that appearance was in no way connected to the operation of 
public schools. 
Ruling in favor of the school system, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court felt that family privacy must surrender to a reasonable school regu­
lation designed to protect the rights of other students, teachers, and 
administrators. Consequently, the court would not substitute its judgment 
for that of the school committee. The basis for this ruling came from 
69 the decision set forth in a previous case , Pugsley v. Sellmeyer in which 
the court was reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of school 
officials. In response to the parents' contention that the rule was an 
invasion of privacy, the court stated, "the domain of family privacy must 
give way insofar as a regulation reasonably calculated to maintain 
school discipline may affect it."^ In answer to the contention that the 
application of the rule was unreasonable, the court responded, "the dis­
cretionary powers of the school committee are broad, and the courts will 
not reverse its decision unless it can be shown it acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. 
The attitude of noninterference developed in Pugsley generally 
prevailed in subsequent hair cases through the late 1960's. Ferrell v. 
^Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 250 S.W. 538 (1923). 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure. (Cincinnati, 
Ohio: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1968), p. 222. 
71Ibid ., p. 222. 
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Dallas Independent School District provides another example of judicial 
72 refusal to interfere in school regulations. In this case, three male 
studentrs were denied enrollment in a Dallas, Texas high school because they 
had "Beatle" hair styles. As members of a musical group, the students claimed 
that their hair styles enhanced audience appeal. The principal felt that 
this type of appearance would be disruptive to the educational process. 
The Ferrell case eventually was decided by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The students argued that the school regu­
lation was unlawful under the state constitution and was also in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The 
Court of Appeals decided that the Constitution does not establish an 
absolute right to free expression and that states1 rights can be infringed 
upon if there exists a compelling reason to do so. The compelling aspect 
in this case was maintenance of an efficient educational process. 
Ferrell was the first haircut case decided at the United States 
Court of Appeals level. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in the Ferrell case. However, the late Justice William 0. Douglas in a 
dissenting opinion stated: 
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states are 
restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can be denied 
education in a public school because of the length of his hair. 
I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might insist 
that every male have a crew cut and every female wear pigtails. 
But the ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later found specific 
definition in the Constitution itself, including of course freedom 
of expression and a wide zone of privacy. ... 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). 
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These two early cases, Leonard v. Attleboro and Ferrell v. Dallas 
Independent School District, serve as an introduction to the legal envir­
onment "of the hair issue. Chapter III will present not only a chronological 
review of hair cases litigated at the state and federal court levels but 
also a constitutional analysis of the issues involved. The cases will be 
presented with respect to geographical boundaries as defined by circuits 
of the United States Courts of Appeals, and in terms of those cases de­
cided in favor of students and those decided in favor of school authorities. 
The number of cases listed will reflect the trend of judicial reasoning 
in each circuit. 
^Leonard v. Attleboro, 212 N .E. 2d 468 (1965). 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. Supp. 
545 (1966). 
37 
Chapter III 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MALE STUDENTS' HAIR GROOMING 
POLICIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OVERVIEW 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained provisions for the delegation 
of congressional authority to "constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme 
Court.The objective was to create a system of national courts suffi­
cient for the size of the country and the federal form of government. Na­
tional and local considerations greatly influenced the development of the 
constitutional court system. The result is a series of ninety-four Dis­
trict Courts and ten numbered Circuit Courts of Appeals plus an unnumbered 
eleventh circuit known as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
The circuits vary in size according to the number of states con­
tained in each geographical area. For example, the second circuit contains 
only three states, while the ninth circuit contains nine states (See Fig. 
2). Each circuit is theoretically headed by one of the Jusitces of the 
United States Supreme Court. The junior Justice is normally assigned two 
circuits. Although the Justices continue to be assigned to a circuit at 
the beginning of each term, lack of time yields little participation at 
the Court of Appeals level. 
The Circuit Courts of Appleas annually decide approximately 
2 6,500 cases that come up from the United States District Courts. The 
^Stephen T. Early, Jr., Constitutional Courts of the United States, 
(Totowa, Mass.: Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1977), p. 2. 
2Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1975), p. 163. 
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Fig. 2. Eleven Circuit Courts of Appeals—Geographical Jurisdictions 
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Court of Appeals represents final authority in approximately eighty-five 
O 
percent of all federal cases. 
Originally the first ten amendments of the Constitution (the Bill of 
Rights) applied only to the federal government. Provisions of the Bill of 
Rights respecting the rights of individuals were made applicable to the 
states by ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. This amendment 
forced the states to grant to all persons equal protection of the law, and, 
more importantly, protection from deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. This opened many areas to federal court reg­
ulation, including the educational process. Student and teacher rights, 
and school activities violating any of the first ten amendments came under 
the federal court umbrella. Consequently, claims of students and school 
authorities concerning long hair have created controversies necessitating 
court litigation for resolution. 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's the avalanche of litigation in 
state and district courts concerning long hair on male students in public 
schools created extensive activity for the United States Courts of Appeals. 
Decisions of the various circuits provide information necessary to identi­
fy the legal aspects of policies regulating hair grooming of male students 
in public schools of the United States. 
The Circuit Courts of Appeals and the District Courts therein stand 
in disagreement on the issue. The first, second, fourth, seventh, and 
eighth circuits have viewed grooming as a constitutional right while the 
third, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth circuits have upheld school authori­
ties' attempts to control hair length. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari in any of these cases. 
3Ibid. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDEMNTS RELATED TO CHOICE OF HAIR STYLE 
Most of the litigation concerning hairstyle codes which involves 
constitutional questions relates to the freedom of speech provision of 
the First Amendment, privacy protections of the Fourth Amendment, the 
right to pursue a profession protected by the Fifth Amendment, prohi­
bition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment, the 
infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, and 
the infringement of due process and equal protection guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The validity of each of these arguments involves 
a balancing of the interests of the state against those of the individual. 
First Amendement 
The "Bill of Rights" became effective on December 15, 1971, approx­
imately three years after the adoption of the United States Constitution. 
These first Ten Amendments were designed to protect individual rights 
of citizens by restricting the power of the Federal Government. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
fion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for redress of grievances.^ 
Inherent guarantees of the First Amendment are basic to liberty 
and are considered fundamental rights of man in a democracy. 
The First Amendment was the most frequently designated amendment 
protecting the right to wear long hair. Students felt that enforcement 
^Edward S. Corwin, ed., Constitution of the United States of America, 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 757. 
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of hair-grooming codes represented an infringment of the freedom of speech 
guaranteed by this amendment. The assertion was that a student may wear 
long hair as a protest to some cultural philosophy and thus the grooming 
choice itself becomes symbolic speech. This was the argument in Richards 
v. Thurston** where the student explained that his hair was a symbol of 
"his association with some of the younger generation in expressing their 
independent aesthetic and social outlook and their determination to reject 
many of the customs and values of some of the older generation."^ The 
student also asserted that long hair was not unlike the wearing of arm­
bands in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District.^ 
The United States Court of Appeals for the first circuit agreed with the 
following conclusion: "Within the commodious concept of liberty . . . 
embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one's hair as 
he wishes."® 
In another example, Church v. Board of Education,^ a Michigan 
student testified that he grew long hair as an expression of his opposition 
to the Vietnam war. The Court of Appeals for the state of Michigan 
held that wearing long hair in this case was constitutionally protected 
as symbolic speech. In its decision the court established that a symbol 
must be specific or identifiable to merit First Amendment protection. 
^Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (1969). 
6Ibid. 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
258 F. Supp. 1971 (1966). 
^Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (1969). 
^Church v. Board of Education, 339 F. Supp. 538 (1972). 
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The Courts of Appeals for the various circuits, however, have 
been unable to agree that hair represents symbolic speech. For example, 
the Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit in Jackson v. Dorrier^ ruled 
that the growing of long hair for commercial purposes was not protected 
by the freedom of speech clause in the First Amendment. 
The Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit in Olff v. East Side 
Union High School District^ ruled that attachment of the label "sym­
bolic speech" to long hair does not make it symbolic speech in the absence 
of circumstances to define properly the intention. The court further stated 
that Tinker did not apply since "Tinker appears to clearly distinguish 
between rights akin to pure speech and those school regulations having to 
do with personal appearance. . . Also in King v. Saddleback Junior 
College District^ the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit ruled that 
Tinker does not apply to hair. 
The Court of Appeals for the tenth circuit in Cranson v. East Side 
Union High School District held that "the wearing of long hair is not 
akin to pure speech. 
The fifth circuit in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District-*--' 
suggested protection of hair by the First Amendment. Similarly, the Court 
^Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d (1973). 
^Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 305 F. Supp. 557 (1969). 
12Ibid. 
^King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F. 2d 932 (1970). 
l^Cranson v. East Side Union High School District, 448 F. 2d 
258 (1971)7 
•'••'Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. Supp. 545 
(1966). 
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of Appeals for the seventh circuit in Breen v. Kahl afforded long hair 
First Amendment protection by virtue of freedom of expression. 
Therefore, the prevailing opinion among the United States Courts 
of Appeals is that the First Amendment does not protect the student's 
right to wear long hair as expression. However, the fifth and seventh 
circuits have ruled First Amendment protection of long hair. 
Fourth Amendmen_t 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu­
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
Security "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" is assured 
to the people within this article. Students have utilized the Fourth 
Amendment for constitutional support of their contention that hair style 
concerns the individual's right to privacy. 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut^ 
has been used by students as a justification for the right to wear long 
hair. In striking down a Connecticut statute that made the utilization 
of contraceptives an offense, the Supreme Court stated that certain pro­
visions of the Bill of Rights have penumbras that create a zone of privacy 
19 that must not be transgressed by the state. 
l6Breen v. Kahl, 269 F. Supp. 702 (1969). 
^Corwin, p. 823. 
•^Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
19Ibid. 
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Extensive references to Griswold in several hair cases indicates 
further consideration of this case is necessary. Griswold gave information 
and medical advice on the prevention of conception to married persons. 
This included an examination of the wife and a prescription of the best 
means of contraception. A former Connecticut law made it a crime for any 
person to use drugs, medicines, or instruments to prevent conception. 
Griswold was found guilty as an accessory but claimed that the statute 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The controversy focused on the right to privacy guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment as this right affected the marital relationship, and 
whether the Constitution in any way prevented state interference in that 
privacy. The United States Supreme Court ruled the Connecticut law un­
constitutional, thus establishing penumbral rights to privacy. 
Courts of Appeals that have considered the Griswold precedent 
stand in disagreement. Although the first circuit has rejected Griswold, 
20 a district court in Connecticut in Crossen v. Fatsi held the grooming 
code unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable and in violation of the 
pupil's right to privacy under the Griswold doctrine. 
The Court of Appeals for the tenth circuit also denied the use 
21 of Griswold as a precedent in Freeman v. Flake. A student, using 
Griswold as a basis, alleged that the hair regulation was an invasion of 
privacy. In refuting this assertion the tenth circuit agreed with the 
ninth circuit ruling in King v. Saddleback Junior College District: 
. . . that conduct controlled by hair regulation is not conduct 
found in the privacy of the home but in public educational 
^Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (1970). 
2freeman v. Flake, 448 F. 2d 258 (1971). 
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institutions where individual liberties cannot be left completely 
uncontrolled to clash with similarly asserted liberties of sev­
eral thousand others.22 
In many other cases students with long hair have attempted to 
bring hair length wi-hin the zone of privacy by pointing to Griswold as 
precedent. However, in Lovelace v. Leechburg.23 jeffers v. Yuba.2^ 
Bishop v. Colaw,^ Shows v. Freeman.26 Gere v. Stanley.27 and Miller 
v. Gillis28 the courts rejected this argument on the basis that the 
bedroom and classroom are quite different. 
In answering the parents' contentions that the grooming code in­
vaded family privacy, the court responded: "... the domain of family 
privacy must give way in so far as a regulation reasonable calculated 
to maintain school discipline may affect it."29 
Therefore, the Courts of Appeals of the first, sixth, ninth, and 
tenth circuits have rejected the Griswold decision while the seventh and 
eighth circuits have indicated that the philosophy of Griswold favors the 
student seeking to retain his long hair. Those courts recognizing the 
applicability of Griswold generally rule in favor of the student while 
those who reject the case or separate it from the long hair issue have 
generally supported school authorities who regulated hair length. 
22Ring v. Saddleback Junior College District. 445 F. 2d 938 (1970). 
23T.nvelace v. Leechburg School District. 310 F. Supp. 579 (1970). 
24 Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School District. 319 F. Supp. 
368 (1970). 
25Bishop v. Colaw. 450 F. 2d 1069 (1971). 
26fihnws v. Freeman. 230 So. 2d 63 (1969). 
27Gere y. Stanley. 453 F. 2d 205 (1971). 
28M-nier v. Gillis. 315 F. Supp. 94 (1969). 
29Kine v. Saddleback Junior College District. 445 F. 2d 938 (1970). 
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Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution follows: 
No"person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with­
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.™ 
The deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law clause in the Fifth Amendment has been invoked chiefly in resistance 
to measures that allegedly infringe on liberty of contract. This amend­
ment has been referred to frequently in cases involving long-haired stu­
dents who are members of some musical group and who claim that their 
wearing long hair enhances audience appeal. Students and their lawyers 
claim that compliance to hair grooming codes constitutes an infringement 
on the right to pursue a profession protected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Such was the case in Dallas, Texas where three members of a rock 
and roll group required by contract to wear "Beatle" hair styles, were 
refused admission to a local high school. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the fifth circuit in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School 
District^! ruled that constitutional rights were not violated in stating 
that the interest of the state in maintaining an orderly system of 
^^Corwin, p. 837. 
-^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. Supp. 
545 (1966). 
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education was of greater importance than the commercial implications of 
long hair. Judge Gerwin said: 
The action taken by school authorities does not, in our view, 
interfere with the appellants1 right to continue in their 
chosen occupation of professional rock and roll musicians. 
It is common knowledge that many performers are required to 
use special attire and makeup, including wigs or hairpieces, 
for their public appearances. At this stage in appellants• 
lives school may be more important than their commercial 
activities . . ,32 
33 
The Supreme Court of the United States declined to renew this case. 
The first hair case that reached a higher court, Leonard v. 
Attleboro,3̂  involved the suspension of a seventeen-year-old senior who 
refused to cut his hair, which he claimed was essential for activities 
a musician. The Massachusetts Supreme Court agreed with school authori­
ties that the "Beatle" hairstyle could disrupt and impede the educa­
tional process and ruled that school officials had the right to order 
the student to get a haircut thus refuting his claim of protection under 
the Fifth Amendment. This case established the trend of judicial thought 
concerning claims of deprivation of liberty or property as protected by 
the Fifth Amendment. 
Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution states that "Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.m3"* Students and their attorneys have 
32Ibid. 33Ibid. 
"^Leonard v. Attleboro, 212 N ,E . 2d 468 (1965), 
CoiTwin, p. 904. 
argued that the constitutional right to wear long hair is located in the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the Eighth Amend­
ment . -
O f. 
A district court in Louisiana in Davis v. Firment held that en­
forcement of the hair-grooming code involved no cruel and unusual punish­
ment. The court stated that the "cruel and unusual punishment" argument 
was "wholly without merit. 
In Southern v. Board of Trustees/^ a Texas district court ruled 
that refusal to admit a student to high school because he did not conform 
to the grooming code did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
These two fifth circuit decisions represent the judicial thought 
concerning the Eighth Amendment, for none of the cases reported upheld 
the students' claim of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Ninth Amendment 
The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution states that "The enumera­
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people."3̂  The only right which 
the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized as protected by the Ninth 
Amendment is the right to engage in political activity. This right was 
established by the decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.^ 
A great obstacle impeding the use of Ninth Amendment concepts of 
retained rights has been a lack of awareness of unenumerated existing 
3̂ Pavis y. Firmeiat, 408 F. 2d 1085 (1969). 
37Hogan, p. 103. 
•^Southern v. Board of Trustees , 318 F. Supp. 355 (1970). 
39Corwin, p. 909. 
^United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). 
49 
rights. Identification of these Court unenumerated rights emanated first 
from the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.^ Writing the decision of 
the court, the late Justice William Douglas relied on the Ninth Amend­
ment along with the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend­
ments in setting forth an unenumerated right of privacy arising from the 
penumbras of specifically guaranteed rights.42 
Students claim that free choice of grooming is a fundamental right 
protected by the Ninth Amendment. In a fifth circuit case, Davis v. 
Firment,^ the plaintiff's argument under the Ninth Amendment for funda­
mental right protection was entirely constructed around the Griswold 
decision. The court held that the right of free choice of grooming was 
not of a nature to be afforded the guarantees provided by the Bill of 
Rights. 
A district court in Utah in Freeman v. Flake44 held that neither 
parents nor students were denied fundamental rights by the enforcement 
of a dress code prohibiting hair on boys from hanging below the collar 
line, over the ears, or below the eyebrows. 
Although the Court of Appeals for the first circuit in Richards 
v. Thurston^5 ruled in favor of the student on other grounds the court 
refused the argument for fundamental rights protection under the Ninth 
Amendment. 
^Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
42Ibid. 
4̂ Pavis v. Firmenj:, 408 F. 2d 1085 (1969). 
44Freeman v. Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531 (1970). 
^Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
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The Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit in Gfell v. Rickelman^ 
reflected and reaffirmed the decision in Jackson v. Dorrier̂  that free­
dom to choose one's hair style is not a fundamental right protected by 
the Ninth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit ruled 
similarly in Rumber v. Board of Trustees. 
Therefore, the first, fourth, sixth, and tenth circuits have 
ruled that free choice in grooming is not a fundamental right afforded 
protection by the Ninth Amendment. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
The Supreme Court in Hibben v. Smith-^ recognized that the Four­
teenth Amendment "operates to extend the same protection against arbitrary 
state legislation, affecting life, liberty, and property as is offered 
by the Fifth Amendment-'-'- and that "ordinarily if an act of Congress is 
valid under the Fifth Amendment it would be hard to say that a State 
law in like terms was void under the F o u r t e e n t h . " ^  
^Gfell y. Rickelman. 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
47jackson v- Dorrier. 424 F. 2d 213 (1970). 
48Rumber v. Board of Trustees. 437 F. 2d 953 (1971). 
^^Corwin, p. 963. 
50Hibhen v. Smith. 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903). 
53-Corwin, p. 971. 
52ibid. 
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Many of the cases involving hair regulations that reached the 
federal court of appeals level involved the argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been violated. Students claimed that enforcement of the 
grooming code violated due process and equal protection of the law. 
DUE PROCESS 
Due process, by definition, identifies that which one is entitled 
to receive. Such entitlement is determined by the customs and expecta­
tions of those who contrive the judgmental process. 
Although the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
guarantee due process of law, the principle appeared much earlier in 
history. For example, the Magna Carta (1215) stated: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of 
his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force 
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.53 
Under mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment ratified in 1868 the 
provisions of the federal constitution are officially extended to the 
states. This gives the federal government extensive power over the admin­
istration of justice within the states. 
The United States Courts of Appeals, in dealing with the hair issue, 
have recognized that school officials must comply with the limitations 
established in the Fourteenth Amendment. This court system, however, is 
in disagreement as to whether the student has the burden to prove that the 
school regulation exceeds the powers of the state to make reasonable codes 
for schools or whether the state must justify limitation on the student's 
"^Harold H. Punke, Social Implications of Lawsuits over Student 
Hairstyles, (Danville Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 
Inc., 1973), p. 143, 
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freedom. If the burden of proof is assigned to the school, for example, 
as in Gfell v. Rickelman,^ Olff v. East Side Union High School District,^5 
and Crews v. Clones^ the major consideration then becomes whether long 
hair causes a disruption of the educational process. Other cases relat­
ing to educational disruption will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In the past, several parts of the federal constitution have been 
identified as offering protection for substantive freedoms. More recently, 
however, state and federal courts have increasingly looked to the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for protection of substantive 
freedoms. 
In Meyers v. Areata Union High School District^ the Court of 
Appeals for the state of California recognized substantive due process 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case the Areata Union 
High School dress code with specific reference to hair stated: "Extremes 
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of hair styles are not acceptable." The court observed: 
A law violates due process if it is so vague and standardless 
that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it pro­
hibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without 
any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is 
not in each particular case. . . . The dress policy concerning 
hair in the present case is vague and standardless. It is 
not a law in the sense that criminal sanctions attend its 
violation, but a violation means suspension from school. The 
importance of an education to a child is substantial . . ., 
and the state cannot condition its availability upon compli- ^ 
ance with an unconstitutionally vague standard of conduct. . . 
~*^Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
•*~*01ff v. East Side Union High School District, 445 F. 2d 932 (1971). 
56Crews y. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970). 
-^Meyers v. Areata Union High School District, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 
(1969). 
"*®Punke, p. 146. 
"^Punke, p. 146, 147. 
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In Karr v. Schmidt^ district court Judge Dorwin Suttle stated 
the following concerning substantive due process: 
The Court also holds that a high school student's individual 
choice of the manner in which he will present himself physi­
cally to the world so far at least as length of hair is con­
cerned is a fundamental substantive right protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
62 In Martin v. Davidson, a district court in Pennsylvania holding 
for the student, reasoned that enforcement of the dress code would deny 
the student liberty and property without due process of law, thus vio­
lating the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Certain cases where the student made no attempt to show that his 
controversial hairstyle represented a substantive right resulted in the 
courts' generally ruling in favor of school authorities. 
Although suspension of the student was upheld in Brownlee v. 
Bradley Board of Education,^3 a district court in Tennessee made the fol­
lowing point: 
No attempt was made on the part of the plaintiff to give reasons 
in support of his preference for maintaining his long hair. He 
does not contend that it represents an expression of any par­
ticular attitude or idea upon his part. Rather, it is apparently 
merely a matter of personal preference with him.^ 
In Brick v. Board of Education^ the Colorado District Court ruled 
that the constitution "protects expressions of ideas and points of view 
^Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728 (1970). 
6lPunke, p. 148. 
^Martin v. Davidson, 322 F. Supp. 318 (1971). 
^Brownlee y. Bradley Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 1360 (1970). 
64punke, p. 148. 
6^Brick v. Board of Education, 305 F. Supp. 1316 (1969). 
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which make a significant contribution to the market place of ideas. 
The court further ruled that regulations controlling mere expression of 
an individuality, specifically hair, did not violate substantive due 
process. 
Also in Gfell v. Rickelman 7̂ the Court of Appeals for the sixth 
circuit, using Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District as a guide 
made the following comment: "The argument that the right of a student 
to determine his own hair length is a matter of substantive due process 
is without merit."^9 
The former cases on substantive due process rights concerning 
length of hair reflect disagreement among the courts. Our legal system 
has not clearly defined substantive rights of students; consequently, 
the disparity is reflected by factually different situations presented 
in each case. 
Question: "How may an individual secure an interpretation or 
enforcement of the right?" The avenues depend upon the availability of 
procedures whereby complaints may be objectively presented and evaluated. 
The Supreme Court decision In re Gault7̂  established specific 
standards and guidelines of procedural due process. In regard to groom­
ing suits, procedural due process relates to grooming requirements, hearing 
procedure regarding violation, the nature of evidence, or appeal. 
^^Punke, p. 148. 
67Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
*>®Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. Supp. 
545 (1966)7 
^Punke, p. 149. 
70In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967). 71Punke, p. 150. 
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Denial of procedural due process was claimed in Leonard v. Attle-
borp72 in the absence of a written notice concerning the hair regulation. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that in the absence of a law re­
quiring the regulations of the school committee to be publicized, pro­
cedural due process was not violated. 
Complaints in Freeman v. Flake^ and Brownlee v. Bradley Board of 
Education^ related to denial of procedural process in terras of inad­
equacy of notice to parents and students about violation of the hair code. 
In both casesj district courts in Utah and Tennessee held that procedural 
due process was not violated. 
In Giangreco v. Center School District the student was refused 
admittance to the public high school because of the length of his hair. 
A Missouri District Court pointed out that since the student was refused 
admittance he could not be expelled. Therefore, in this case the absence 
of a notice and hearing did not violate procedural due process. The 
court stated: 
Persons who do not qualify for admittance are not entitled to the 
same type of notice and hearing afforded to those who are admitted 
and suspended or expelled. . . . And in a case of this kind where 
a violation of the challenged regulation was evident to all on the 
plaintiff's face, there is no necessity for a hearing on the issue 
of whether plaintiff's head, face, and neck hair complied with the 
regulation.76 
^Leonard v. Attleboro, 212 N.E. 2d 468 (1965). 
^Freeman v. Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531 (1970), 
7^Brownlee v. Bradley Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 1360 (1970). 
75Giangreco v. Center School District, 313 F. Supp. 776 (1969). 
^Punke, p. 152. 
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In Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School District^? denial of pro­
cedural due process was claimed when the school board refused to change 
the ha±r-grooming code, because a majority of the students opposed the 
rule and secondly, because there was no hearing before suspension. A 
California District Court held that school authorities were not required 
to change school regulations simply because a majority of the students 
supported the change. The court also decided that there was no factual 
dispute to be resolved through a hearing, thus procedural due process 
was not violated. 
Southern v. Board of Trustees,Jackson v. Dorrier,^ and Rumber 
v. Board of Trustees®® cases saw students' claims of denial of procedural 
due process denied. 
Conyers v. Glenn^l proved a different case as the Florida State 
Supreme Court, in addressing the claim of due process denial, ruled that 
the student was entitled to a hearing on the reasonableness of the hair 
code. 
These examples of case law indicate that adequate notice of 
charges and an informal hearing concerning hair grooming codes are suf­
ficient requirements of procedural due process. 
7?Jeffers  v. Yuba City Unified School District, 319 F. Supp. 368 
(1970). 
^Southern v. Board of Trustees, 318 F. Supp. 355 (1970). 
79jackson y. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 212 (1970). 
^Rumber v. Board of Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (1971). 
^Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204 (1971). 
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EQUAL PROTECTION 
_ Students in some hairstyle cases have claimed that they were de­
nied equal protection of the law as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
82 In Miller v. Gillis, for example, the student claimed that enforcement 
of the dress code denied equal protection. With respect to boys the 
dress code stated: 
Hair should always appear clean and neat tapered up the back of 
the neck, and not protruding over the ears or the eyebrows. Stu­
dents must be clean shaven and sideburns should not extend lower 
than the earlobes.®^ 
Although ruling in favor of school authorities for other reasons, 
a district court in Illinois held that a regulation violates the equal 
protection clause if it falls within one or more of the following cate­
gories: 
1. The regulation is not necessary to the exercise of the in­
herent police powers of the state to provide for the health, 
education, and general welfare of the people of that state; 
2. The regulation once promulgated is incapable of meeting the 
need to which the regulation is directed; 
3. The regulation creates by its enforcement, an evil greater 
than that evil sought to be corrected; 
4. The regulation is arbritrary in defining a class of people 
to which it applies. 
82Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (1969). 
®"*Punke, p. 159. 
84Ibid. 
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QC 
Crews v. Clones*" involved the claim of denial of equal protection. 
In this particular case, Eugene Clones, principal of Indiana's North Cen­
tral Hfgh School, argued that short hair was required for health and 
safety reasons. Problem areas included the gymnasium, swimming pool, 
and the laboratory. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
health and safety argument because health and safety objectives could be 
achieved by rules directed specifically at the problems created by long 
hair, i.e., requiring swimming caps in pools and hair nets around machinery 
or Bunsen burners. Also the rules applied only to boys, and school officials 
offered no reasons why health and safety objectives were not applicable 
to girls. The court ruled that the school board's actions denied equal 
protection to male students. 
Claims of denial of equal protection have been rejected in sev-
qz: 
eral cases, however: Livingston v. Swanquist, Giangreco v. Center 
School District,8? Brick v. Board of Education,88 Gfell v. Rickelman,89 
and Brownlee v. Bradley Board of Education. 
Summarily, the Courts of Appeals for the first, fourth, seventh, 
and eighth circuits have found the right to wear long hair protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, thus placing the burden of proof on school 
85Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970). 
^Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (1970). 
^^Giangreco y. Center School District, 313 F. Supp. 776 (1969). 
88]3rick v. Board of Education. 305 F. Supp. 1316 (1969). 
89Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (1970), 
^Brownlee v. Bradley Board of Education. 311 F. Supp. 1360 (1970), 
59 
authorities. The Court of Appeals in the seventh circuit (Massiev. 
Henry)^'1 has taken the strongest position in favor of students by sug­
gesting that school authorities cannot justify a need to regulate long 
hair until they have tried and failed to alleviate the problem by disci­
plining those students whose reaction to long hair creates an educational 
QO 
disturbance." 
Conversely, the Courts of Appeals for the sixth, ninth, and tenth 
circuits have rejected the idea that long hair is a substantive right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The third and fifth circuits 
have upheld hair regulations as reasonable while recognizing a Fourteenth 
Amendment right. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Cases analyzed in this study reflect division among the courts on 
the issue of student constitutional rights in choice of coiffure. Con­
cerning constitutional protection two lines of thought have developed. 
In cases where the student assumes the burden of proof the ruling involves 
constitutional protection for the right to wear long hair. When consti­
tutional protection for a student's choice of hairstyle is assumed the 
burden of proof lies with school authorities, to justify infringement by 
proving a need for the grooming regulation. 
The opinion of a Tennessee District Court in Brownlee v. Bradley 
Board of Education^ was that the burden of proof lies with the student. 
9*Massie v. Henrx, 455 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
Page Johnson, "The Constitution, the Courts, and Long Hair," 
The Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, 
57 (April, 1973), 31. 
^Brownlee v. Bradley Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 1360 (1970). 
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Relative to burden of proof the court made the following statement: 
In consequence of the general presumption in favor of the validity 
of regulations adopted by public bodies acting within their author­
ity, the general rule is that a party alleging the unconstitutionality 
of a statute or regulation has the burden of substantiating his 
claim and the presumption of the constitutionality of the regulation 
will prevail unless its repugnancy to the Constitution clearly 
appears, . . . This rule regarding the burden of proof may be 
modified where the complaining party succeeds in establishing that 
the right alleged to have been infringed is a constitutionally 
granted right. 
Similarly in Breen v. Kahl,95 Lambert v. Marushi,96 and King v. 
Saddleback Junior College District^? the courts determined that the bur­
den rests on the student to prove the grooming code unconstitutional. 
QO 
However, in Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Board, ° Miller 
v. Gillis,99 Black v. Cothreij-QQ and Martin v. Davidsonthe courts 
held that school officials had the burden of justifying the hair code. 
It has been demonstrated, then, that the third, fifth, sixth, 
ninth, and tenth circuits have placed the burden of proof on the student 
while the first, fourth, seventh, and eighth circuits have placed the 
burden of proof on school officials. 
Whether constitutional protection for the right to wear long hair 
is claimed under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth 
9^Punke, p. 164. 
9^Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (1969). 
^^Lambert v. Marushi, 322 F. Supp. 326 (1971). 
97jCing v« Saddleback Junior College District, 445 F. 2d 932 (1971). 
^^Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Board, 322 F. Supp. 286 
(1971). 
^Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp, 94 (1969). 
lOOBlack v. Cothren) 316 F. Supp. 468 (1970). 
lOJ-Martin v. Davidson, 322 F. Supp. 318 (1971). 
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Amendment, a similar analysis is required. Once it has been determined 
that a personal liberty is involved, the interests of the student in 
selecting his choice of coiffure and obtaining an education must be 
balanced against the state's interests of protecting the health and wel-
face of all students in public schools and ensuring the effective opera­
tion of the educational system. 
DISRUPTION OF EDUCATIONAL PROCESS 
The most frequent and most successful argument by school authori­
ties against long hair has been disruption to the educational process. 
This claim is that other students become so excited over a long-haired 
male that control of the classroom becomes difficult, thus eliminating 
a learning situation. Credibility of this claim also becomes a consid­
eration for the court. Although most courts have accepted the disruption 
102 
argument, the prevailing attitude in Crews v. Clones and Richards v. 
103 
Thurston was that the true motive for excluding long-haired students 
was a personal distaste for persons who do not conform to societal norms. 
The disruption theory originated in Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen­
dent School District!^ when the Supreme Court suggested that school 
regulation, although violating constitutional rights, might be upheld if 
"justified by a showing that the students' activities would materially 
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."105 
^"^Crews v. Clones, 432 F. 2d 1259 (1970). 
Richards v. Thurston. 304 F. Supp. 449 (1969). 
lO^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 258 F. Supp. 
1971 (1966) . 
Michael Brown, "Hair, the Constitution, and Public Schools," 
Journal of Law and Education, 1, (July, 1972), 378. 
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Utilizing the disruption theory in Griffin v. Tatum,^^ school 
authorities listed the following as impeding the educational process: 
. . boys' haircuts that do not conform to the regulation cause 
the boys to comb their hair in classes and to pass combs, both 
of which are distracting; cause the boys to be late for classes 
because they linger in the restrooms combing their hair; cause 
the boys to congregate at a mirror provided for girls to use 
while combing their hair; in some instances, cause an unplea­
sant odor, as hair of a length in excess of that provided by 
the regulation often results in the hair being unclean; cause 
some of the boys who do not conform to the haircut regulation 
to be reluctant about engaging in physical educational acti­
vities (presumably because they do not want to "mess" their 
hair); and, finally, cause resentment on the part of other stu­
dents who do not like haircuts that do not conform to the school's 
haircut regulation.107 
In addressing the contentions of school authorities, the Middle 
District Court of Alabama presented the following resolution: 
The school authorities' reasons for the necessity for such a 
haircut rule completely fail. If combing hair or passing combs 
in classes is distracting, the teachers, in the exercise of their 
authority, may stop this without requiring that the head be shorn. 
If there is congestion at the girls' mirrors, or if the boys are 
late for classes because they linger in the restrooms grooming 
their hair, appropriate disciplinary measures may be taken to stop 
this without requiring a particular hair style. If there is any 
hygenic or other sanitary problem in connection with those stu­
dents who elect to wear their hair longer than that presently 
permitted by the regulation there are ways to remedy this other 
than be requiring their hair shorn. The same is true of their 
failure to participate in the physical educational programs. 
As to the fear that some students might take action against the 
students who wear hair longer than the regulation now permits, 
suffice it to say that the exercise of a constitutional right 
cannot be curtailed because of an undifferentiated fear that the 
exercise of that right will produce a violent reaction on the 
part of those who would deprive one of the exercise of that con­
stitutional right.108 
106Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F. 2d 201 (1970). 
^^David L. Kirp and Mark G. Yudof, Educational Policy and The 
Law, (California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 508. 
108Ibid. , p. 509. 
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The Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit affirmed this decision 
in 1970^-®^ by classifying the actions of the school administration un­
reasonable. 
_ Sims v. Colfax Community School DistrictU.0 involved the hair 
length of a female student. The Southern District Court of Iowa relied 
heavily on the Tinker language of disruption to write its opinion. In 
sustaining the student's right to wear her hair as she wished, the court 
stressed that only reasonable school rules and regulations are permissible. 
These rules become reasonable when they are made in apprehension of sub­
stantial interference with the educational process. The court stated: 
. . . school hair rules are reasonable and thus constitutional only 
if the school can objectively show that such a rule does in fact 
prevent some disruption or interference of the school system.HI 
Also in Parker v. FryH2 the Eastern District Court of Arkansas, 
ruling in favor of the student, held that school officials failed to show 
the dress code reasonable relative to the educational process. 
In Karr v. Schmidt113 judge Dorwin Suttle generalized that school 
codes have been upheld 
. . . where the school has objectively demonstrated that long hair 
resulted in disruptions of the educational process such as harass­
ment, use of obscene or derogatory language, fights, health or 
safety hazards, obscene appearance or distractions of other stu­
dents, . . . The touchstone for sustaining such regulations is 
the demonstration that they are necessary to alleviate interfer­
ence with the educational process. 
lO^Griffin v. Tatum. 425 F. 2d 201 (1970). 
H^Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 307 F. Supp. 485 (1970). 
m Vernon F. Haubrich and Michael W. Apple, Schooling and the Rights 
of Childrenr (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), 
p. 151. 
H^Parker v. Frvr 323 F. Supp. 728 (1971). 
Vj Schmidt. 460 F. 2d 609 (1972). 
H^Punke, p. 222. 
The Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit in Breen v. Kahl^^ 
determined the grooming code unreasonable, thus refuting the claim of 
educational disruption. The fourth circuit adopted a similar position 
in Massie v. Henry. 
Therefore, the first, fourth, seventh, and eighth circuits have 
found grooming codes unreasonable thus denying school authorities' claims 
of educational disruption. 
SPECIAL AREAS OF HAIRSTYLE CONSIDERATION*!? 
Athletics 
Most hairstyle suits refer to general constitutional questions, 
discipline, or disruption with more specific reference often made to 
cleanliness, health, or safety. Objections that courts have raised to 
codes designed for general types of public school situations may not be 
applicable to the more specialized areas. 
In some instances school authorities have established special 
grooming codes to govern athletes. For example, in Neuhaus v. Torrey*-*-^ 
a California High School exhibited the following dress code: 
1. Each athlete will be well groomed and neat in appearance 
at all times. 
2. Each athlete will be well shaven. 
3. The hair will be out of the eyes, trimmed above the ears 
and above the collar in the back. 
115Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034 (1970). 
•^Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
^••^Punke, p. 253. 
^Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (1970). 
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4. Willful violation of the rules by any athlete will lead 
to his suspension from all athletic competition during 
the season in which the rules infraction occurred. 
Some of the high school athletes sought an injunction to prevent 
enforcement of the grooming code. Ruling in favor of school authorities 
the Northern District Court of California stated; 
In these parlous, troubled times, when discipline in certain 
quarters appears to be an ugly word, it should not be con­
sidered unreasonable nor regarded as an infringement of 
constitutional prerogatives, to require plaintiffs to bring 
themselves within the spirit, purpose, and intendment of the 
questioned rule.120 
In Dunham v. Pulsiferl^l f however, a district court in Vermont 
held that excluding only long-haired students from the tennis team, where 
long hair was not reasonably related to the conduct of the athletic pro­
gram, was a denial of equal protection. 
The Gfell v. Rickelmanl^ case> heard by the Court of Appeals for 
the sixth circuit, held that a grooming code which prohibited hair from 
covering the ears had a reasonable relationship to athletic programs, 
In a further statement of boundary, the 1975 case, Zeller v. 
121 Donegal School District Board of Education, J the Court of Appeals for 
the third circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed the complaint of a student 
who was seeking monetary relief for his exclusion from a soccer team 
for noncompliance with the dress code, 
119 
Punke, p. 258. 
120Ibid., p. 259. 
^•^Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (1970). 
l^Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
•^Zeller v. Donegal School District Board of Education, 517 F. 
2d 600 (1975). 
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Within the athletics realm, then, courts tend to assume more 
stringent restrictions for participation in the voluntary or more per-
124 sonally privileged aspects of the school program. 
Health and Safety 
Grooming codes have generally been upheld when the argument in­
volves the promotion of health and safety. For example, in Blaine v. Board 
of Education's t̂ e gUpreme Court of Kansas held enforcement of the hair 
regulations constitutional on the grounds that they were aimed at avoiding 
potential disruption and at promoting safety in shop classes. Also, in 
Pound v. Holladayl26 the Northern District Court of Mississippi ruled in 
favor of school authorities, who claimed that long hair impaired vision 
and thus affected the safety of students working around machinery or 
making laboratory tests. 
The Court of Appeals for the third circuit futher addressed safety 
19 7 in Gere v. Stanley. Although recognizing length and style of hair as 
constitutionally protected, the court upheld enforcement of regulations 
pertaining to the length, or at least the management, of hair as a con­
dition for taking shop courses. The court suggested that hair nets or 
head bands might be required to assure safety. Similar rulings occurred 
in Turley v. Adel Community School District^** and Westley v. Rossi. 129 
l P̂unke, p. 258. 
l^Blaine v. Board of Education. 210 Kan 560 (1972) 
l^^Pound v. Holladay. 322 F. Supp. 1000 (1971). 
l^Gere v. Stanley. 453 F. 2d 1281 (1971). 
l^Turley v. Adel Community School District. 322 F. Supp. 402 (1971). 
^^Westlev v. Rossi. 305 F. Supp. 706 (1969). 
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Medical Considerations 
In Epperson v. Board of Trustees, Pasadena Independent School 
- 1 ̂ 0 
District the Southern District Court of Texas failed to recognize hair 
as a personally protected right. The student in question had suffered 
birth defects which had affected the shape of the student's head and posi­
tion of the ears. His parents argued that their son's compliance with 
the hair code would emphasize these abnormalities and result in psycholo­
gical damage. The ruling of the court became moot, however, when hair 
regulations were modified, allowing longer hair in instances of medical 
exceptions . 
Removing Evidence from the Record 
In those hairstyle cases in which the ruling has been in favor of 
the student, courts have ordered that school records be cleared of any 
evidence that the student violated any school regulation concerning hair­
style. In Griffin v. Tatum,^^ Breen v. Kahl,^"^ Sims v. Colfax Commu­
nity School District Turley v. Adel Community School District ,134 
1 o5 
and Crossen v. Fatsi, the rulings of the courts included expunging from 
the school records any reference to violation of hair grooming codes. 
130 
Epperson v. Board of Trustees, Pasadena Independent School 
District, 386 F. Supp. 317 (1974). 
131Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F. 2d 201 (1970). 
132Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034 (1970). 
l^Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 307 F. Supp. 485 (1970). 
1 
Turley v. Adel Community School District, 322 F. Supp. 402 (1971). 
IOC 
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (1970). 
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Monetary Benefits 
Frequently, the monetary benefits of hairstyle cases amount to 
court Costs. In some cases where the courts found the grooming codes un­
constitutional the costs of courts were assessed against the defendents. 
This occurred in Sims v. Colfax Community School District Turley y. 
Adel Community School District,Parker v, Fry.^^ Breen v. Kahl,^9 
and Crossen v. Fatsi.^^ 
Students' claims have also included punitive damages. This re~ 
quest, however, was dismissed in Karr v. Schmidt,-*-^ Martin y. Davidson, 
and Black v. Cothren. 
In Miller v. Gillis"^^ the Northern District Court of Illinois 
dismissed a student's claim for three hundred dollars in actual damages 
and one thousand dollars in punitive damages. Another case, Cordova y. 
Chonko involved the Northern District Court of Ohio ruling that the 
student was entitled to damages, However, since the student had suffered 
no actual pecuniary loss, the court awarded the traditional one cent. In 
*^Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 307 F. Supp. 485 
(1970). 
1 
Turley v. Adel Community School District. 322 F. Supp. 402 
(1971) . 
arker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728 (1971). 
139Breen v. Kahl. 419 F. 2d 1034 (1970). 
^^Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp, 114 (1970). 
^•^Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728 (1970). 
^^Martin v. Davidson, 322 F. Suppt 318 (1971). 
•^^Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (1970). 
1^Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (1969). 
•^"'Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (1970). 
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Davis v. Firment-^^ the Eastern District Court of Louisiana dismissed the 
student's claim for twelve thousand dollars in damages. However, Edward 
Blews, principal of Douglas McArthur High School in Miami, Florida was 
ordered by the United States District Court in Miami (Pyle v. Blews) 
to pay Timothy Pyle, the student and plaintiff in the action against 
Blews, the sum of two hundred eighty-two dollars (one hundred dollars for 
compensatory damages and one hundred eighty-two dollars for court costs)/*-4® 
DIVISION OF THE COURTS 
Confusion and division exemplify the attitudes of state and fed­
eral courts concerning long hair on male students in public high schools. 
An examination of each judicial district, defined by the eleven United 
States Courts of Appeals, in terms of cases decided in favor of students 
and those decided in favor of school authorities further demonstrates this 
state of this issue. 
First Circuit 
Decision for students. In Crossen v. Fatsi 4̂̂  Ellen Crossen, 
on behalf of her son, sought reinstatement as a pupil at Tourtellotte 
Memorial High School in Thompson, Connecticut. The Crossen minor had 
been suspended in the fall of 1969 because his hirsute appearance vio­
lated the school dress code. J. Claire, the District Court judge, ruled 
146Pavis v. Firment, 408 F. 2d 1085 (1969). 
l47Pyle v. Blews, U.S.D.C. Fla. 7-1829-Civ-Je, 1971. 
4̂®M. Chester Nolte, "Your District's Dress Code and Why Its 
Probably Hasn't a Hair of a Chance in Court," American School Board Journal, 
159 (August, 1971), 26. 
l  4 9  
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (1970). 
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that high school dress code which required students to be neatly dressed 
and groomed was unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable, for such a 
code would invade the pupil's right of privacy. 
Decision for school authorities. Farrell v. Smith^O was a 1970, 
Maine case decided in favor of the school authorities. District Court 
Judge J. Gignoux, ruled that the school's grooming code restricting beards, 
sideburns, and long hair did not deny students any substantive rights 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, especially 
where neat appearance of the student body enhanced the image of the school 
in the eyes of employers who were recruiting on campus. 
The judicial attitude of the first circuit, however, was determined 
by the 1970 decision in Richards v. Thurston.In this decision, the 
Court of Appeals ruled that the suspension of a high school student, who 
wore his hair "falling loosely about his shoulders," violated personal 
liberty and was improper in the absence of a state justification for the 
intrusion. 
Second Circuit 
Decision for students. All cases reported in the second circuit 
were ruled in favor of students. The final authority, however, was re-
159 
presented at the district court level. Yoo v. Moynihan was a state 
court case litigated in 1969 by the Superior Court of Connecticut. The 
court held that the right of a student to style his hair as he pleased 
150Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (1970). 
^Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
152Yoo V. Moynihan, 262 A. 2d 814 (1969). 
fell within penumbra of the Constitution which protects right of privacy 
and was a right free of governmental intrusion, 
-A 1970 district court case in Vermont, dealing with the athletic 
greoming code, Dunham v. Pulsifer,-*-̂  represents the supreme authority 
of the second circuit. The district court ruled unconstitutional the 
grooming code with justifications based on performance, discipline, and 
dissension within teams. This court viewed the enforcement of the code 
as an infringement of fundamental rights of equal protection. 
Third Circuit 
Decisions for students. Most cases reported at the district court 
level ruled in favor of the student. Lovelace v. Leechburgin 1970, 
and Martin v. Davidson in 1971, Axtell v. LaPenna^"^ in 1971, Minnich 
1 5 7  i 5 8  
v. Nabuda in 1972, and Seal v. Mertz in 1972 provide examples. In 
each case the district court held that the hair-grooming code was unrea­
sonable and infringed on fundamental rights, privacy, or due process 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Decisions for school authorities. At the Court of Appeals level, 
however, judicial reasoning has been in favor of school authorities. In 
l^Dunham v> Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (1970). 
^•"^Lovelace v. Leechburg, 310 F. Supp. 579 (1970). 
•^^Martin v. Davidson, 322 F. Supp. 318 (1971). 
l^Axtell v> LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 (1971). 
^•^^Minnich v. Nabuda, 336 F. Supp. 769 (1972). 
l^Seal v> Mertz, 338 F. Supp. 945 (1972). 
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a 1971 case, Gere v. Stanley, t h e  Co u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  
the hair->length regulation was not an arbitrary exercise of power and 
did not deny due process when the educational process had been disrupted. 
Disruption in this case was "due to students' refusal to sit near stu­
dent in class because of dirtiness of his shoulder length hair and re­
fusal to sit near him in cafeteria because of his habit of dipping his 
hair into his food and then throwing his hair back,"!*'® 
•t £1 
In Zeller v. Donegal School District Board of Education, the 
parents of a Pennsylvania High School student brought suit seeking equi­
table and monetary relief under the Civil Rights Act concerning the stu­
dent's exclusion from a soccer team for refusing to obey the athletic 
code regulating hair. This case, decided, in 1975, held that the request 
for equitable relief became insignificant at graduation, and that consti­
tutional interpretation calls more for the making of value judgment than 
the application of specific rules. The court reiterated the decision that 
there are certain areas of state school regulation in which the federal 
court should not intervene. 
Fourth Circuit 
Decisions for students. In 1971, a West Virginia case, Lambert v. 
Marushj.,^^ the District Court ruled the suspension of a long-haired stu­
dent unconstitutional as school officials failed to show that the long 
l~^Gere v. Stanley, 453 F. 2d 205 (1971). 
l60Ibid. 
16l2eller v. Donegal School District Board of Education, 517 F. 
2d 600 (1975K 
^^Lambert v. Marushi, 322 F. Supp. 326 (1971). 
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hair style actually created a discipline problem. The court stated "school 
officials' mere fear that relaxing of ban against long hair would lead to 
disciplinary problems was insufficient justification for deprivation of 
constitutionally protected rights. . ."163 
Long v. Zopp.164 wag a case involving the denial of a football 
letter to a student who allowed his hair to grow long after the football 
season and the Court of Appeals ruled this action unlawful. This 1973 
ruling followed dismissal of the case at the District Court level. Also, 
in 1973 in Mick v. Sullivan.^^5 the Court of Appeals held that the right 
to choose one's hair style is a constitutional right protected by the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1972 in Massie v. HenryJ-66 the Court of Appeals for the fourth 
circuit held that the right to choose hair length was guaranteed by due 
process and equal protection. 
Decisions for school authorities. Although the fourth circuit 
has basically ruled in favor of the student, a 1971 case, Rumber v. 
1 fi 7 
Board of School Trustees for Lexington County District Number One, was 
decided in favor of school authorities. In this case, the Court of Appeals 
held that students did not show irreparable injury necessary for grant­
ing an injunction against the dress code. The students had cut their 
hair, had been readmitted to school, and were allowed to make up midterm 
exams missed during suspension. 
163Ibid. 
v. Zopp. 476 F. 2d 180 (1973). 
165^jck v. Sullivan. 476 F. 2d 973 (1973). 
l^^Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
•^Rumber v. Board of School Trustees for Lexington County District 
Number One. 437 F. 2d 953 (1971). 
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Fifth Circuit 
Decisions for students. The fifth circuit represents the area 
most active in litigation concerning long hair, A United States Court 
of Appeals case in 1970, Griffin v. Tatum,^8 was ruled partially for 
the student. The court found that enforcement of the dress code, inter­
preted to require the hair of a male to be tapered in back as opposed 
to blocked, constituted arbitrary classification to the extent that it 
violated equal protection and due process. A 1971 Florida State Court 
169 
case, Conyers v. Glenn, also ruled the hair regulation in violation 
of due process. In Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Board^^ the 
United States Court of Appeals ruled unnecessary the hair style regula­
tions promoted by the school board. 
Decisions for school authorities. Most cases litigated in the 
fifth circuit were decided in favor of school authorities. The Supreme 
Court of Mississippi (Shows v. Freeman^-*-) in 1969 held that a regulation 
forbidding hair longer than two inches above the eyebrow did not invade 
family privacy and had rational basis to determine disruption of the 
educational process. 
1 70 
In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction, 1970, a Florida Dis­
trict Court ruled that the school hair regulation prohibiting bizarre or 
exotic styles did not deny the student due process. Southern v. Board 
^^Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F. 2d 201 (1970). 
•*-^Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1971). 
^Dawson v. Hillsborough County School Board, 445 F. 2d 308 
(1971). 
^^"Shows y. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63 (Miss. 1969). 
i  7? 
Canney y. Board of Public Instruction, 231 So. 2d 34 (1970). 
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of Trustees,1'J Whitesell v. Pampa Independent School District, and 
Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District^** are 1970 cases 
litigated in Texas at the district court level. Each case determined 
the hair regulation necessary to insure effective operation of the 
school and to promote discipline. Also in 1970 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Ciruit ruled similarly in Wood v. Alamo Heights 
Independent School Districtand Stevenson v. Board of Education of 
Wheeler County, Georgia.^7 
The trend continued in 1971 in a Mississippi District Court case, 
Pound v. Holladay."^^ Here, the court held that the hair style regula­
tion requiring hair to be cut so that it does not hang over ears and top 
of collar of a standard dress shirt was necessary to prevent educational 
179 
interference. A district court in Texas in Hammonds v. Shannon found 
that the hair regulation was reasonable and valid in all respects and 
violated no constitutional rights. In a hearing on this case, Supreme 
Court Justice Hugo Black, assigned to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
said: 
173 
Southern v. Board of Trustees^ 318 F. Supp. 355 (1970). 
174 
Whitesell v. Pampa Independent School District, 439 F. 2d 1198 
(1970). 
^"'Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District, 308 
F. Supp. 570 (1970). 
•^^Wood v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, 433 F. 2d 
355 (1970). 
"''^Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County, Georgia, 
400 U.S. 957 (1970). 
178Pound v. Holladay, 322 F. Supp. 1000 (1971). 
^^Hammonds v. Shannon, 323 F. Supp. 682 (1971). 
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I refuse to hold for myself that the federal courts have consti­
tutional power to interfere with the public school system ope­
rated by the states. 
Karr v. Schmidt-^! in 1972 and Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish 
School BnarHl82 in 1973 were similarly litigated by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Ruling in favor of school authorities in 
each case, the court held that there is no constitutionally protected right 
to wear one's hair in a public high school in a manner that suits the wearer. 
Mercer v. Board of Trustees, North Forest Independent School Dis­
trict .183 a 1976 case involved a suit challenging the constitutionality 
of a hair length regulation which applied only to males. The Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals held that the two-tiered approach used by the 
United States Supreme Court in equal protection cases is an appropriate 
method to determine the constitutionality of laws under the state equal 
rights amendment. 
Sixth Circuit 
Decisions for students. The overall judicial opinion of the sixth 
circuit tends to favor school authorities; however, many cases were de­
cided for the student. In an Ohio case in 1970, Cordova v. Chonko.l^ 
the district court ruled the suspension of a student for disobeying the 
hair dress code unconstitutional due to denial of due process and fair 
^^Karr v. Schmidt. 460 F. 2d 609 (1972). 
^^Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Board. 472 F. 2d 438 
(1973). 
183 
Mercer v. Board of Trustees. North Forest Independent School 
District, 538 S.W. 2d 201 (1976). 
^^Cordova v. Chonko. 315 F. Supp. 953 (1970). 
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treatment. Two years later a district court in Michigan in Church v. 
Board of Education-*-^ ruled the grooming code in violation of First 
Amendment rights of expression where the student was symbolically ex­
pressing a political viewpoint and when the educational process was not 
impeded. 
Jacobs v. Benedict ^86 the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that 
hair regulations were not necessary for the government of schools. In 
this case the student was removed from office as president of the student 
council and member of the honor society because he violated the hair-
grooming code. The court also ruled the regulations discriminatory since 
they did not apply to girl students. 
187 
In 1974, a Court of Appeals in Michigan in Graber v. Kniola 
found that the ruling that hair on males not reach the bottom of the 
collar and be above the eyes was not related to the purpose of compul­
sory school attendance. 
In MzClung v. Board of Education of the City of Washington, 188 
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the high school grooming code could not be 
readily applied to bar the publication of a picture of a long-haired 
student in the school yearbook. 
1 RQ 
In Brownlee v. Bradley County, Tennessee Board of Education, a 
district court found that the dress code regulating the length of male 
•^•^Church v. Board of Education, 339 F. Supp. 538 (1972). 
186Jacobs v. Benedict, 316 N.E. 2d 898 (1973). 
187craber v. Kniola, 216 N.W. 2d 925 (1974). 
*®®McClung v. Board of Education of the City of Washington, 346 
N.E. 2d 691 (1976). 
*®^Brownlee v. Bradley County Tennessee Board of Education, 331 
F. Supp. 1360 (1970). 
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students' hair was neither arbitrary nor capricious and did not violate 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Also in 1970, another Tennessee 
case, Jackson v. Dorrier,-*-^ the United States Court of Appeals held that 
enforcement of the dress code prohibiting long hair on male students did 
not violate due process. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit in 1971, 
upheld the decision that enforcement of the hair grooming code was neither 
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and was considered necessary to 
promote the educational process. This decision came from Gfell v. Rickel-
man^l and was reiterated in an Ohio District Court case, Mercer v. Latham-
e£l92 1971, Also in 1971 in Laucher v. Simpson-*-93 the court of Appeals 
of Ohio held that suspension was proper where the student knew in advance 
of adoption of dress code. 
In Dunkerson v. Russell-*-^ 1973, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
determined that the dress code regulating length of male students' hair 
raised no constitutional issue. 
The hair issue continued to be a legal question as late as 1977. 
105 
In Royer y. Board of Education the Ohio Court of Appeals summarized 
the judicial trend concerning hair length in the sixth circuit with the 
following statements: 
l^Ojackson v. Dorrier, 424 F. 2d 213 (1970). 
^^"Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
^^Mercer v. Lothamer, 321 F. Supp. 335 (1971). 
•^•^Laucher v. Simpson, 276 N.E. 2d 261 (1971). 
•^^Dunkerson v. Russell, 502 S.W. 2d 64 (1973). 
-^~*Royer v. Board of Education, 365 N.E. 2d 889 (1977). 
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1. The enforcement of a school board's dress code as it relates 
to hair length does not infringe on state or federal consti­
tutional rights. 
2. In the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, 
courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion 
by school authorities, 
3. Hair dress codes are necessary to promote discipline and pro­
vide a healthy environment for academic purposes.196 
Seventh Circuit 
Decisions for students. Most cases reported in the seventh cir­
cuit were decided in favor of the student. In Miller v. Gillisl97 a 
district court in Illinois found that the high school dress code stating 
that boys' hair should be "clean and neat, tapered up the back of the 
neck, and not protruding over the ears or the eyebrows'' denied equal 
198 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, In Laine v. Dittman an 
Appellate Court of Illinois held in 1970 that expulsion of a male stu­
dent for wearing his hair down on his shoulders was an abridgement of 
constitutional rights. 
1  Q Q  
Cash v. Hoch in 1970 demonstrated plaintiff entitlement to 
relief by a male proving that the sanctions imposed on him had been done 
so due to his refusal to comply with a hair cut regulation. 
196Ibid. 
197Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (1969). 
•^^Laine v. Dittman, 259 N.E. 2d 824 (111. 1970). 
199casji y. Hoch. 309 F. Supp. 346 (1970) , 
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In 1972 the United States Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit 
in Arnold v. Carpenterruled that even though the dress code had been 
prepared by students, teachers, and administrators, the hair provision 
of the code was unconstitutional. 
oni 
An Illinois district court, deciding the case of Copeland v. Hawkins 
in 1973 held that the anticipated fear that allowing students to grow long 
hair might cause harmful pressure on younger students to emulate shaggy 
older students, that teachers would favor students with short hair, and 
that boys could not shower properly after strenuous physical education 
programs did not justify the school hair code. 
The United States Court of Appeals in 1974 in Holsapple v. Woods'^ 
held that long hair on males did not adversely affect the learning exper­
ience. The court also ruled that there was no connection between length 
of hair and discipline problems and that the right to wear one's hair at 
any length was a personal freedom protected by the Federal Constitution. 
Decisions for school authorities. Although the seventh circuit 
has ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the student, some cases were decided 
for school authorities. In Livingston v. Swanquist^^ in 1970 a district 
court in Illinois held that enforcement of the hair provision of the 
school dress code did not deprive students of freedom of speech and ex­
pression. 
^^Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F. 2d 939 (1972). 
^^•Copeland v. Hawkins , 352 F. Supp. 1022 (1973) . 
^^Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F. 2d 49 (1974) . 
^^Livingston v. Swanquist, 314 F. Supp. 1 (1970), 
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Eight Circuit 
Decisions for students. The dominant judicial opinion of the eighth 
204 
circuit has been in favor of the student. In Westley v. Rossi, 1969, 
a district court in Minnesota ruled that the student could not be pre­
vented from attending public high school because he did not wear a con­
ventional hairstyle. The court held that there was no health hazard in 
wearing long hair as long as it was clean. 
? 0 5  
In Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 1970, a female 
student questioned the constitutionality of a school rule governing length 
of hair. The district court in Iowa held that the school rule, applicable 
to both male and female students, that hair must be kept one finger width 
above the eyebrows violated constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Also in 1970 in Parker v. Fry2̂  and Black v. Cothren.^Q? 
district courts respectively in Arkansas and Nebraska ruled hair regula­
tions unconstitutional where there was no evidence of educational dis­
ruption . 
208 
In 1971 in Turley v. Adel Community School District a district 
court in Iowa held the hair style code unconstitutional where the school 
district failed to demonstrate reasonableness of the rule, 
^'Hfestley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (1969). 
205 
Sims v. Colfax Community School District, 307 F. Supp. 485 
(1970). 
206Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728 (1970). 
2Q?Black y. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (1970). 
2^®Turley v. Adel Community School District, 322 F. Supp. 402 
(1971). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the eighth circuit in 
209 
Bishop v. Colaw. 1971, held that the high school dress code regulating 
hair length was invalid and unenforceable where the regulation was not 
necessary to carry out the institutional mission of high school. One year 
? i n 
later in Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools -1 the Court of Appeals held 
that the hair-grooming code violated constitutional rights of privacy and 
211 
personal freedom. Also in 1972 in Wallace v. Ford, a district court 
in Arkansas ruled in favor of the student in absence of proof that long 
hair was disruptive. 
Decisions for school authorities. The four cases described here 
are characteristic of cases in the eighth circuit which decided in favor 
o f  s c h o o l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  I n  G i a n g r e c o  v .  C e n t e r  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t 1 9 5 9  ̂ 
a district court in Missouri held that enforcement of the hair-grooming 
code did not abridge student's right of free speech where the rule was 
adopted to prevent verbal and violent distraction. In Corley v. Daunhauert̂ 13 
a district court in Arkansas held that the public school system has a 
right to require students who wish to participate in the school band to 
conform to the hair grooming code. The United States District Court in 
Carter v. Hodges 1970, held that the dress code prohibiting long hair 
^O^sishop v- Colaw, 450 F. Supp. 1069 (1971). 
^^Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
211Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156 (1972). 
^-^Giangreco v> Center School District, 313 F. Supp. 776 (1969). 
^•^Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp, 811 (1970). 
^^Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (1970). 
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was reasonably related to the educational process and was valid. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri in Kraus v. Board of Education of the City of 
2 1 5  
Jennings, 1973, held that the dress code adopted by the city board of 
education was constitutional. 
Ninth Circuit 
Decisions for students. In Meyers v. Areata Union High School 
District, 1969, a district court in California ruled that the high 
school dress policy stating that extremes of hair styles were not acceptable 
was unconstitutionally vague. Also in ruling in favor of the student, 
California District Court for the central division in Alexander v. Thomp-
217 son held that burden would be on school officials to establish their 
authority to deprive student of his right to public education because of 
the length of his hair. 
In 1971 in Berryman v. Hein,^-^ a United District Court in Idaho 
stated that length of hair had no reasonable relationship to the educa­
tional process and enforcement of the dress code would impose upon stu­
dents' personal liberties. Also in 1971 the Supreme Court of Idaho in 
219 Murphy v. Pocatello School District further ruled that the wearing 
of long hair created no substantial health, safety, academic or disci­
plinary problem. 
2 1 5  
Kraus v. Board of Education of the City of Jennings . 492 S.W. 
2d 468 (Mass. 1965). 
^•^Meyers v. Areata Union High School District, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 
(1969). ~ 
^^Alexander Vt Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (1970). 
^^Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (1971). 
^•^Murphy v. Pocatello School District, 480 P. 2d 878 (Idaho 
1971). 
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220 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona in Komadina v. Peckham, 1971, 
221 
and the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Neuhaus v. Federico, 1973, found 
no connection between length of hair and quality of education in ruling 
for the student. 
Decisions for school authorities. In Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified 
School District.^22 1970, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
Division of California, held that enforcement of the dress code prohibiting 
hair draping over ears, shirt collars, or eyes was reasonably related to 
the educational process and did not deprive students of constitutional 
rights. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit in Qlff v. 
East Side Union High School District,223 1971^ held that extreme hair 
length interfered with educational processes and enforcement of the dress 
code did not violate due process. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
in Pendley v. Mingus Union High School District,224 1972, held that enforce­
ment of the hair provision of school dress code did not violate due pro­
cess. 
Tenth Circuit 
Decisions for students. Most cases reported in the tenth district 
were decided in favor of school authorities. In Independent School District 
^^Komadina v. Peckham, 478 P. 2d 113 (1971). 
22lfleuhaus v. Federico, 505 P. 2d 939 (1973). 
^^Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School District, 319 F. Supp. 
368 (1970). 
223Q2ff v_ East Side Union High School District, 404 U.S. 971 
(1971) . 
224 
Pendley v. Mingus Union High School District, 504 P. 2d 919 
(1972). 
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v. Swanson,^25 however, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1976 held that 
unless there was clear showing of a reasonable connection between proper 
educational functions and hair code, the board did not have authority to 
adopt such a code. 
7 2 f i  
Decisions for school authorities. In Brick v. Board of Education, 
1969, the United States District Court in Colorado held that long hair on 
males tended to disrupt school activity. 
Ruling in favor of school authorities the United States District 
Court in Utah in Freeman v. Flake,^27 igjo> held that enforcement of the 
hair regulation did not violate either students' or parents' right of 
privacy nor did it deny freedom of expression. The court further stated 
that the regulation did not deny procedural or substantive due process of 
equal protection. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the tenth circuit in 
228 
Christmas v. El Reno Board of Education, 1971, upheld an Oklahoma 
District Court decision in favor of school authorities. The Court of 
Appeals held that suspension of hair styles of male students in state 
public schools was a matter for the states. 
NATURE OF DIVISION 
The time span of "The Great Haircut Crisis of Our Time" was from 
1965 to 1977.2^9 The greatest amount of litigation occurred in the 
2 2 Independent School District v. Swanson, 553 F. 2d 496 (Okla. 1976) . 
226grick v> Board of Education, 305 F. Supp. 1316 (1969). 
227preeman v< Flake, 320 F. Supp. 531 (1970). 
22̂ Christmas v. El Reno Board of Education, 
229Mary Anne Raywid, "The Great Haircut Crisis of Our Time," Phi 
Delta Kappan, 48 (December, 1966), p. 150. 
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late 1960's and early 1970*3 (See Fig. 3). Lower court decisions are di­
vided with almost fifty percent holding in favor of students and the 
others"holding for school boards. Within each judicial circuit, how­
ever, the percentages reflect more variation (See Fig. 4). The fifth, 
sixth, and eighth circuits litigated the greatest number of cases while the 
second decided the least (See Fig. 4). 
Several courts have commented on dividedness. The Middle District 
o on 
Court of Pennsylvania in Gere v. Stanley presented one of the most 
comprehensive summaries of arguments given in other hair style cases by 
opponents and supporters of grooming codes. 
The anti-dress regulation supporters argue (1) that the vigi­
lant protection of constitutional freedoms is no where more vital 
than in the community of American schools; (2) that new ideas and 
innovative thought should be encouraged in the classroom; (3) that 
eccentric hair style is no longer a reliable signal of perverse 
or improper behavior; (4) that there is no inherent reason why 
decency, decorum or good conduct requires a boy to wear his hair 
short; (5) that a policy to impose conformity should not prevail 
over the personal liberty of a student to choose his hair style; 
(6) that mere unattractiveness in the eyes of others, short of 
uncleanliness, should not justify such a proscription; (7) that 
forbidding a student to wear long hair because it annoys others 
allows their prejudice and biases to govern his rights; (8) that 
compliance with a hair length rule imposes an unreasonable con­
dition to plaintiffs continuing as a student in a public educa­
tional system; (9) that unlike restrictions on dress which require 
compliance only during school hours , a requirement that hair be 
cut to a certain length remains with the student off the school 
premises as well as on; (10) that the curtailing of a student's 
fundamental rights imposes a substantial burden of justification 
on school authorities; and (11) school officials must show that 
a student's appearance materially and substantially interferes 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation 
of the school before it can be regulated. 
The pro-regulation advocates contend (1) that the high school 
educational mission brings together hundreds of immature, volatile, 
and aggressive children in closely confined quarters and must 
necessarily subject them to a wide variety of disciplinary mea­
sures in order to provide a suitable atmosphere for concentration 
^"^Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852 (1970). 
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instruction, and study; (2) that in formulating regulations, in­
cluding those pertaining to the discipline of school children, 
school officials should have a wide latitude of discretion; (3) 
that for many youngsters learning is a discipline rather than a 
pleasure and it must be carried out in a dignified and orderly 
surroundings if it is to be practiced successfully; (4) that 
obedience to duly constituted authority is a valuable tool and 
respect for those in authority must be instilled in your peo­
ple; (5) that regulations concerning dress are a part of the 
disciplinary process which is necessary to maintain a balance 
as between the rights of individual students and the rights of 
the whole in the functioning of schools; (6) that eccentric hair 
style and attire tends to distract and disturb the student body, 
thereby interfering with a teacher's ability to instruct; (7) that 
the regulation of dress and appearance involves faddish symbols and 
styles and not intellectual discourse which is of much greater im­
portance and should be accorded a greater degree of protection 
against the restrictions of school authorities; (8) that interfer­
ence by the courts in the day-by-day operation of the school would 
dilute the authority of the educational systems, and in turn, 
undermine the effectiveness of the school master and the teacher, 
and (9) that the courts should uphold school regulations where 
there is any rational basis for the questioned rule.231 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Overview 
There is no right to appeal to the Supreme Court an adverse de­
cision. One does, however, have the right to petition the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari. Ninety percent of the cases decided by the 
232 
Supreme Court reach the court through a writ of certiorari. The grant 
of certiorari, a Latin term meaning "made more certain" or "better 
233 
informed" signifies the willingness of the Supreme Court to review a case. 
The Supreme Court states that certiorari will be granted only in 
the presence of special and important reasons. Among these are the 
231Ibid., pp. 856, 857. 
232Renry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), p. 174. 
^•^Ibid. , p. 175. 
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following: 
1. where two federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have rendered 
conflicting decisions; 
2. where a state or federal appellate court has passed on an 
important question of federal law on which the Supreme 
Court has never passed; 
3. where lower courts have rendered a decision that conflicts 
with applicable precedent established by the Supreme Court; or 
4. where a federal court has so far departed from the accepted 
canons of judicial proceedings as to call for exercise of 
the Supreme Court's power of supervision.234 
Review of cases by certiorari, however, is influenced by numerous 
considerations extraneous to their merits as established by formal criteria. 
Grant of a petition may depend upon the Justices biases for 
or against the questions raised, their regard for the standing 
of the lower court, and their estimate of the reputation of the 
lower-court judges who have previously dealt with the issues. 
Other factors include their intuitive judgments of timing, pub^ 
lie reaction, and the impact of the probably decision upon the 
Court's public image. Their estimate of the public interest 
in the issues raised, their balancing of public response to 
inaction verses action, and their calculations of consequences 
for significant social interests are also important among the 
myriad influences working on the minds and emotions of indi­
vidual Justices. 
Most Justices automatically discard cases presenting ques­
tions about one or a few persons or a restricted locality, 
unique issues of conflict or ones unlikely to arise again for 
many years, and cases raising no federal question or none of 
sufficient substance to warrant attention.^35 
234 Ibid. 
235gtephen T. Early, Jr., Constitutional Courts of the United 
States, (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1977), p. 143. 
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A case, however, does not have to be of major significance in 
order to be granted certiorari. For example, in Thompson v. City of 
Louisville, a case involving two ten-dollar fines for loitering and 
disorderly conduct, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Under Ken­
tucky law, the fines involved were too small to be reviewed by any state 
appellate court. Speaking for the unanimous Court, Justice Black stated: 
Our examination of the record presented in the petition for 
certiorari convinced us that although the fines here are 
small, the due process questions presented are substan­
tial . . ,237 
In a dissenting opinion in Parr v. Burford238 Justice Felix 
Frankfurter made the following statement in an attempt to clarify the 
Supreme Court's attitude concerning denial of certiorari: 
. . . it seemed that the issue was either not ripe enough or 
too moribund for adjudication; that the question had better 
wait for the perspective of time or that time would bury the 
question or, for one reason or another, it was desirable to 
wait and see, . . . 
This opinion has prevailed concerning the hair issue as the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari. The Supreme Court has 
denied certiorari in cases where the lower court sustained the school 
board,and it has denied certiorari in cases where the lower court 
23̂ Thompson v> City of Louisville, 362 US 199 (1960). 
237Abraham, p. 177. 
238Parr v. Burford, 339 US 200 (1950) . 
239Abraham, p. 179. 
2̂ Karr v. Schmidt, 401 US 1201 (1971); Livingston v. Swanquist, 30 
L Ed 937 (1970) ; Breen v. Kahl, 398 US 937 (1970) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Inde­
pendent School District, 393 US 856 (1968); King v. Saddleback Junior 
College District, 404 US 979 (1972) ; Marshall v. Oliver, 385 US 945 (1970); 
Akin v. Board of Education, 393 US 1041 (1969). ~ 
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overruled the school board.24̂  
Denial of Certiorari: Opinions of Justices 
William Douglas and Hugo Black_ 
Despite sharp differences among the federal courts concerning 
grooming regulations only two Supreme Court Justices, William Douglas and 
Hugo Black, have presented official opinions. 
Justice William Douglas was the only member of the Supreme Court 
who indicated that the hair issue should be reviewed. In an opinion dis­
senting from the denial of certiorari in Olff v. East Side Union High 
School District,242 justice Douglas expressed support of students: 
It seems incredible that under our federalism, a State can 
deny a student education in its public school system unless 
his hair style comports with the standards of the school 
board.243 
Justice Douglas expressed that the grooming code concerning hair 
was extreme. He further stated: 
Students in school as well as out of school are persons under 
our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights 
which the State must respect, just as they themselves must 
respect their obligations to the State.244 
Justice Douglas also recognized that under certain circumstance 
enforcement of the hair code might be justified. For example, "an epi­
demic of lice might conceivably authorize a shearing of locks."24̂  
24̂ Holsapple v. Woods, 95 S Ct 185 (1974); Olff v. East Side Union 
High School District, 92 S Ct 703 (1972) ; Stevenson v. Board of Education, 
400 US 957 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 400 US 850 (1970); Freeman v. Flake, 
405 US 1032 (1972). 
24201ff v. East Side Union High School District, 30 L Ed 2d 736 
(1972). 
243Ibid. 244Ibid. 
245Ibid. 
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Justice Douglas concluded his dissenting opinion with the following: 
The federal courts are in conflict and the decisions in disarray. 
We have denied certiorari where the lower court has sustained 
the school board and also where it has overruled them. The 
question tendered is of great personal concern to many and of 
unusual constitutional importance which we should resolve. I 
would grant this petition and set the case for argument. 4 
Justice Douglas also dissented with opinion in the denial of 
certiorari in Freeman v. Flake.^47 
Today the Court declines to decide whether a public school may 
constitutionally refuse to permit a student to attend solely 
because his hair style meets with the disapproval of the school 
authorities. I can conceive of no more compelling reason to 
exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such 
magnitude on an issue of importance bearing on First and Ninth 
Amendment rights.248 
In Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District2̂  tjje court of 
Appeals for the fifth circuit upheld the school grooming code. Con­
sequently, the student petitioned the Supreme Court to review the de­
cision. The Supreme Court denied certiorari with Justice Douglas writing 
the lone dissent. 
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states 
are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can be 
denied education in a public school because of the length of 
his hair. I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots 
might insist that every male have a crew cut and every female 
wear pigtails. But the ideas of "life, liberty, and pursuit 
of happiness," expressed in the Declaration of Independence, 
later found specific definition in the Constitution itself, 
including, of course, freedom of expression and a wide zone 
of privacy. I had supposed those guarantees permitted idio-
syncracies to flourish, especially when they concern the image 
246Ibid. 
^^Freeman piake, 405 US 1032 (1972) . 
248Ibid. 
249Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 US 856 
(1968). 
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of one's personality and his philosophy toward government and 
his fellow men. 
Municipalities furnish many services to their inhabitants, 
and I had supposed that it would be an invidious discrimination 
to-withhold fire protection, police protection, garbage collec­
tion . . . (or an education) merely because a person was an 
offbeat nonconformist when it came to hairdo and dress as well 
as diet, race, religion, or his views on Vietnam.^50 
Hugo Black, as the Supreme Court Justice assigned to the Court of 
Appeals for the fifth circuit, reviewed a motion arising from Karrv. 
Schmidt.^51 The Court of Appeals reversed a district court that had 
enjoined enforcement of the El Paso grooming code. The student presented 
a motion to Justice Black to suspend the action of the Court of Appeals 
pending appeal to the Supreme Court. In denying the motion Justice 
Black wrote the following: 
The motion in this case is presented to me in a record of 
more than 50 pages.... The words used throughout the record 
such as "Emergency Motion" and "harassment" and "irreparable 
dangers" are calculated to leave the impression that this case 
over the length of hair has created or is about to create a great 
nation "crisis." I confess my inability to understand how any­
one would thus classify this hair length case. The only thing 
about it that borders on the serious to me is the idea that any­
one should think the Federal Constitution imposes on the United 
States' courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that 
public school students should wear. The records of the federal 
courts, including ours, show a hearing burden of litigation in 
connection with cases of great importance—the kind of litigation 
our courts must be able to handle if they are to perform their 
responsibility to society. Moreover, our Constitution has 
sought to distribute the powers of government in this nation 
between the United States and the States. Surely, the federal 
judiciary can perform no greater service to the nation than to 
leave the states unhampered in the performance of their purely 
local affairs. Surely few policies can be thought of that 
250David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of Students, 
(New York; Harper and Row, 1975), p. 166. 
25lRarr v. Schmidt, 401 US 1201 (1971). 
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states are more capable of deciding than the length of the hair 
of school boys. There can, of course be honest differences of 
opinion as to whether any government, state or federal, should 
as a matter of public policy regulate the length of haircuts, 
but it would be difficult to prove by reason, logic, or common 
sense the federal judiciary is more competent to deal with hair 
length than are the local school authorities and state legis­
latures of all our 50 states.252 
Since the Supreme Court has viewed the hair length issue unworthy 
of consideration, the split of the circuit courts of appeals stands. Long 
hair, beards, and moustaches among the young have become more commonplace 
and acceptable. Consequently, conflict concerning long hair has subsided. 
252 
Schimmel, pp. 165, 166. 
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Chapter IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COURT CASES REGARDING 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF LONG HAIR 
ON MALE STUDENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
When two or more circuits from the United States Courts of Appeals 
reach conflicting decisions in similar issues, the Supreme Court of the 
United States usually establishes a precedent that is binding throughout 
all the states. Since the Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari 
to any hair case, the decisions reached in the United States Courts of 
Appeals reign supreme. 
Chapter IV will present a descriptive survey of selected court 
cases that represent the judicial opinion concerning hair length from 
each of the circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals. 
All circuits except the second have ruled on the hair issue at 
the court of appeals level; consequently, a district court ruling repre­
sents the supreme authority from the second circuit. The only case re­
ported from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was a 
non-school case and, as such was insignificant to this study. 
Treatment of each case will include the facts, the court decisions, 
and discussion of the questions presented. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
RICHARDS v. THURSTON 
304 F. Supp. 449 (1969) 
424 F. 2d 1281 (1970) 
Facts 
Robert Richards, Jr. was a seventeen-year-old student at Marlboro 
High School in Marlboro, Massachusetts. The plaintiff student was sus­
pended by Roger Thurston, principal of Marlboro High School, solely for 
refusal to have a haircut, which the student wore in a style reminiscent 
of the English music group, "The Beatles." The student claimed that sus­
pension violated the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Robert Richards, Jr., by his father, 
filed suit in the United States District Court of Massachusetts against 
the principal of Marlboro High School seeking restoration of his status 
as a member of the senior class. 
Decision 
The District Court of Massachusetts on September 23, 1969 held 
that the student could not properly be suspended from high school for 
refusal to have his hair cut to an extent approved by the principal. 
Concerning violation of Civil rights the court stated: 
. . . student's claim could properly be brought under section 
of Civil Rights Act creating liability for persons who under 
color of state law subjects another to deprivation of rights, 
privileges, or immunities . . . * 
The court also held that the plaintiff's claim to liberty of 
appearance is entitled to protection from the state under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
^Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 450 (1969). 
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In a supplementary opinion on September 29, 1969 the District 
Court presented the following: 
_ (1) The opinion carefully noted that in this case there was 
no applicable Massachusetts statute and there was no for­
mal school regulation with respect of hair styles; 
(2) The opinion emphasized that no factual foundation had 
been laid to show that there was in issue any point with 
respect to health, sanitation, or discipline; 
(3) An attempt to impose conformity for the sake of conformity, 
or merely to accord with a principal's prejudices is not 
entitled to prevail over the personal liberty of a stu-
2 dent to choose his hair style. 
The principal appealed, but on April 28, 1970 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the first circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.^ 
Tne Court surmised: 
We see no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or good conduct 
requires a boy to wear his hair short. Certainly eccentric hair 
styling is no longer a reliable signal of perverse behavior. We 
do not believe that mere unattractiveness in the eyes of some 
parents, teachers or students, short of uncleanliness, can jus­
tify the proscription. Nor, finally, does such compelled con­
formity to conventional standards of appearance seem a justifiable 
part of the educational process.4 
Discussion 
This case, which established the judicial attitude of the first 
circuit concerning hair, became a precedent in the issue of whether length 
or style of hair is a valid right guaranteed under the Constitution of 
^Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 454 (1969). 
^Richards v. Thurston, 424 F. 2d 1281 (1970). 
4Ibid., p. 1286. 
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the United States. This much cited decision reasoned that liberty en­
compasses small personal aspects of life (such as hair) as well as the 
more prominent ones. The Richards court used reasoning similar to that 
used in Tinker in recognizing, that, at times, personal liberties must 
be curbed for reasons of public interest. However, long hair at school 
does not qualify for such infringement. Therefore, the court established 
the core of this case to be a part of the Fourteenth Amendment where it 
protects the personal liberty of every individual from unreasonable in­
trusions . 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
DUNHAM v. PULSIFER 
312 F. Supp. 411 (1970) 
Facts 
On December 15, 1969, school authorities at Brattleboro Union 
High School, Brattleboro, Vermont, adopted a statement of eligibility 
for participation in extra-class scholastic activities. The statement 
set forth a general expression of policy; however, it did not establish 
any rules or regulations for the student body. Contained in the administra­
tive guidelines was the following statement concerning dress and grooming: 
The school administration in consultation with the appropriate 
department head and with coaches or other sponsors, may set 
specific standards of dress and grooming for pupils during 
participation in and travel to and from interscholastic ac­
tivities as may be necessary to properly carry out such 
activities 
In November of 1969 the high school adopted a student dress code 
and on December 16, 1969, the school board enacted a specific code govern­
ing the appearance of athletes. Concerning hair styles the code stated: 
5 
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 413 (1970). 
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For males, hair must be cut tapered in the back and on the 
sides of the head with no hair over the collar. Sideburns 
must be no lower than the earlobe and trimmed. 
" On April 16, 1970, Steven Dunham was prevented from participating 
in a tennis match for noncompliance with the grooming code. The student 
sought action against Bruce C. Pulsifer, Superintendent, in the United 
States District Court of Vermont to forbid school authorities from en­
forcing the athletic grooming code on grounds of denial of equal pro­
tection. 
Decision 
On May 5, 1970, the United States District Court of Vermont held 
that the athletic grooming code concerning male hair styles was unconsti­
tutional. The court reasoned that asserted justifications based on per­
formance, dissension on teams, discipline and conformity and uniformity 
were not substantial justification for infringement on fundamental rights. 
The court ordered: 
(1) That Steven Dunham be reinstated as a member of the tennis 
team at Brattleboro Union High School with the same rights 
and privileges as before his suspension. 
(2) That school authorities be permanently enjoined from in-
forcing the athletic grooming code at Brattleboro Union 
High School.^ 
Discussion 
This case is significant in that it not only established a pre­
cedent for the second circuit, but also it distinguished hair from clothing 
6Ibid., p. 413. 
^Ibid. , p. 421. 
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and indicated that restrictions on hair styles are more serious invasions 
of individual freedom than are clothing regulations. The court stated: 
The cut of one's hair style is more fundamental to personal 
appearance than the type of clothing he wears. Garments can 
be changed at will whereas hair, once it is cut. has to re­
main constant for substantial periods of time.® 
Therefore, the court distinguished clothing from hair style on the follow­
ing grounds: (1) hair style is more fundamental to personal appearance, 
(2) restrictions concerning hair have a long-term effect, and (3) hair 
styles today usually do not involve issues of morality and distraction 
as do some styles of clothing.^ Moreover, for these reasons, some courts 
that recognize choice of hair style as a constitutional right do not pro­
tect choice of clothing style. Also, others give school boards much 
wider discretion to control clothing in the interests of health, safety, 
order, or discipline.-^ 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
GERE v. STANLEY 
320 F. Supp. 852 (1970) 
453 F. 2d 205 (1971) 
Facts 
Jerald Gere was a sixteen-year-old eleventh-grader at Blue Ridge 
High School located in New Milford, Pennsylvania. While there was no 
written dress code prior to the 1968-69 school year, requests of faculty 
8Ibid ., p. 419. 
^David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of Students, 
(New York; Harper and Row, 1975), p. 173. 
10Ibid. 
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members who complained that hair style changes were causing disruptions 
in the classroom, prompted the principal to orally inform the student 
body of requirements relative to student appearance. Parents were in­
formed in a newsletter from the principal of the grooming code which 
included the following: 
Hair length will be determined to a large extent by how well 
it is kept and groomed. When the hair becomes so long that it 
can't meet these conditions then a haircut is in order. No 
beards or mustaches are allowed. Sideburns may be worn even 
with the ears.H 
Meanwhile several complaints were made to the principal concerning 
the hair style and appearance of Jerald Gere, who had allowed his hair to 
grow shoulder length and was attempting to grow a goatee. For example, 
(1) a student complained that due to Jeraid's poor eyesight, he leaned 
forward to the degree that while eating his hair would hang in his plate 
and he would then throw his hair back out of the plate, causing annoyance 
to others in the cafeteria, (2) another student refused to sit near Jerald 
in class because of his dirty hair. The student claimed "she couldn't 
tell what might crawl out of it,"12 while (3) others accused him of 
combing the long stands of his goatee while in class. 
Jerald agreed to wash his hair but refused to get it cut and was, 
therefore, formally suspended on March 24, 1970. Consequently, Jerald 
Gere, by his father, brought action against Emory R. Stanley, Superin­
tendent of Blue Ridge School District, in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming denial of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
HGere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852^ 854 (1970). 
l^Ibid., p. 854 l^Ibid., p. 854. 
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Decision 
On November 6, 1970 the District Court of Pennsylvania held that 
where the student wore long hair as a matter of personal taste and not 
as a means of expression the student could be properly suspended for 
violating the dress code. The court made its ruling under the following 
considerations: 
(1) The school dress code represented the consensus of 
administrators, faculty, student council, and school 
board; 
(2) The student's long hair caused some commotion among 
students; 
(3) The hair style regulation was reasonable and necessary 
to alleviate interference with the educational process.^ 
The complaint was dismissed thus ruling in favor of school authorities. 
The student appealed, while the United States Court of Appeals for the 
third circuit on December 27, 1971, affirmed the lower court decision.^ 
Discussion 
Gt 
Concurrent with establishing the judicial attitude of the third 
circuit concerning hair, this case established that hair style does not 
constitute free speech within the protection of the First Amendment or 
a fundamental right under the Ninth Amendment. The court also recognized 
that the authority of the state to control the conduct of children reaches 
beyond its power over adults. 
-^Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852, 853 (1970). 
•^Gere v. Stanley, 453 F. 2d 205 (1971). 
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ZELLER v. DONEGAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
333 F. Supp. 413 (.1971) 
517 F 2d 600 (1975) 
Facts 
Brent Zeller was a seventeen-year-old student at Donegal High 
School in Pennsylvania. Under the athletic rules and regulations of 
the Donegal School District, no player was allowed to participate in 
interscholastic athletic activities unless his hair was trimmed in accord­
ance with the following regulation: 
As a member of the Donegal School Athletic Teams you are expected 
to understand that the real athlete keeps his hair neat and clean 
at all times, trimmed above the ears and neatly trimmed in back.-^ 
Zeller was denied the right to participate in the activities of 
the Donegal High School soccer team for noncompliance with the hair-groom­
ing code. Consequently he brought suit against the Donegal High School 
District challenging the constitutionaltiy of the hair grooming code 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The student claimed that there 
was no basis for the regulation in that it was not designed to protect 
the health, safety, or welfare of the students. He also alleged that 
length of hair in no way impedes performance in soccer. This suit was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
Decision 
On October 26, 1971, the District Court of Pennsylvania, proceed­
ing on a motion from the school district, dismissed the student's com­
plaint. The court held that because of the Commonwealth's special interest 
•^Zeller y. Donegal School District, 333 F. Supp. 413, 414 (1971). 
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in the educational system and due a lack of substantial federal question, 
the case was to be decided through local procedures, including, if nec­
essary, the Commonwealth and its courts. Relying on the ruling in Free-. 
1 7 man v. Flakex/ the court utilized the following: 
The United States Constitution and statutes do not impose on 
the federal courts the duty and responsibility of supervising 
the length of a student's hair. The problem, if it exists, is 
one for the states and should be handled through state pro­
cedures. 
The student's parents appealed and brought suit against the Donegal 
School District Board of Education seeking equitable and monetary relief. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the third circuit, en banc, held 
that the request for equitable relief became moot upon the student's 
graduation and that there are areas of state school regulation in which 
the federal courts should not intrude. Consequently on May 14, 1975 the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. 
Discussion 
This case reaffirmed the judicial attitude of the third circuit 
established in Gere v. Stanley.^ The Zeller court established for the 
third circuit that the issues emanating from hair length did not warrant 
judicial treatment at the federal court level. That court relied on the 
20 principle enunciated in Epperson v. Arkansas that "courts do not and 
"^Freeman v. Flake, 448 F, 2d 258 (1971), 
^Zeller v. Donegal School District, 333 F. Supp. 413, 415 
(1971). 
^Gere v. Stanley, 453 F. 2d 205 (1971). 
20Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 US 97 (1968) . 
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cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily 
operation of school systems . . ."21 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
MASSIE v. HENRY 
455 F. 2d 779 (1972) 
Facts 
Joseph Massie was suspended from Tuscola Senior High School, Haywood 
County, North Carolina for his deliberate refusal to conform to the hair-
grooming code. The code, recommended by a student-faculty-parent committee 
and adopted by the high school principal, stated that hair should not be 
grown below collars and should not cover the ears. Also stated in the code 
was the decree that side burns should not extend below the ear lobes. 
Joseph Massie's coiffure violated all points of the regulation. The stu­
dent brought action seeking injunctive relief, but the United States Dis­
trict Court for the Western District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint. 
Massie appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
fourth circuit. 
Decision 
On February 2, 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
fourth circuit reversed the lower court decision and ruled in favor of 
the student.The Court of Appeals held that the grooming code was not 
justified on theory of need for discipline and considerations of safety. 
^Zeller v. Donegal School District, 517 F. 2d 600, 608 (1975). 
^Massie v. Henry, 455 F. 2d 779 (1972). 
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The court stated: 
With respect to hair, this is no more than a harkening back to 
the fashion of earlier years. For example, many of the found­
ing fathers, as well as General Grant and General Lee, wore 
their hair (either real or false) in a style comparable to that 
adopted by the plaintiff. Although there exists no depiction 
of Jesus Christ, either reputedly or historically accurate, He 
has always been shown with hair at least the length of the 
plaintiff. If the validity and enforcement of the regulation 
in issue is sustained, it follows that none of these persons 
would have been permitted to attend Tuscola Senior High School. 
Discussion 
Utilizing the theme "in the style of the founding fathers," this 
case established the fourth circuit's viewing of choice of hair style as 
a constitutionally protected right.^ Although the court ruled that hair 
worn in a certain manner simply because of personal preference was not en­
titled to protection as a form of symbolic speech, it did consider choice 
of hair style as an aspect of the right to be secure in one's person 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Con­
cerning safety in shops and laboratories the court suggested that requir­
ing the use of hair nets would be more appropriate than requiring hair­
cuts. The attitude of the Massie court was most appropriately summed up 
by the following: 
. . . faculty leadership in promoting and enforcing an attitude 
of tolerance rather than one of suppression or derision would 
obviate the relatively minor disruptions which have occurred. 
^Massie v. Henry. 455 F. 2d 779, 780 (1972) . 
24Ibid. 
^David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, The Civil Rights of Students, 
(New York; Harper and Row, 1975), p. 161. 
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FIFTH CIRCUIT 
FERRELL v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
261 F. Supp. 545 (1966) 
392 F. 2d 697 (1968) 
Facts 
The dress code for W. W. Samuel High School in Dallas, Texas 
was taken from a book written by the superintendent of the Dallas Inde­
pendent School District. Concerning attire and grooming, the code stated 
that "principals will determine when attire of students is in good taste,"^6 
Phillip Ferrell, Stephen Webb, and Paul Jarvis were denied the 
right to admission and enrollment solely because of the length and style 
of their hair. The students sought injunctive relief in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the Dallas 
Independent School District, claiming that enforcement of the grooming 
code violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Four­
teenth Amendment. 
The plaintiffs were members of a rock music group and claimed that 
their "Beatle" type hair style was required through contractual agreement 
with the booking agent. Their group, Sounds Unlimited, also recorded a 
song that was aired on many radio stations in protest. Entitled "Keep 
Your Hands Off of It," the song contained the following verses: 
"Went to school, got kicked out, 
Said it was too long, now we're going to shout. 
"Keep your hands off of it, 
Keep your hands off of it, 
It don't belong to you. 
"Bopped upon the steps, Principal I met, 
You're not getting in, now what do you want to bet. 
26perrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 261 F. Supp. 545 
(1966), : 
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"Went to school this morning, tried to get in, 
The kids were for us, but we still couldn't win. 
"HAIR, THAT IS."27 
Decision 
On December 9, 1966 the Northern District Court of Texas denied 
injunctive relief for the students. The court held that refusal of school 
authorities to allow students to enroll until their hair had been cut was 
not an abuse of discretion and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This decision also reinforced that the contract between "Sounds Unlimited" 
and the booking agent was unenforceable under Texas law insofar as minors 
were concerned. 
The plaintiffs appealed; however, on April 30, 1968 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the fifth circuit affirmed the lower court 
O Q nn 
ruling. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. 
Discussioii 
This is one of the earliest cases in the avalanche of litigation 
concerning the hair issue. The Ferrell decision has been cited often as 
a precedent in subsequent hair cases throughout the judicial circuits. 
Establishing the judicial attitude of the fifth circuit concerning hair, 
this decision espoused that the Constitution of the United States does 
not guarantee an absolute right to free expression of ideas if there exists 
27Ibid., p. 549. 
2®Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F. 2d 697 
(1968). 
^Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 393 U.S. 856 
(1968). 
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a compelling reason by the state for infringement. In this case the com­
pelling state reason was promotion of educational decorum. This court 
also established that controlling length of hair of male students does 
not constitute an infringement of the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
KARR v. SCHMIDT 
320 F. Supp. 728 (1970) 
460 F. 2d 609 (1972) 
Facts 
On August 12, 1970, Chesley Karr was informed that he could not 
register as a student in Coronado High School in El Paso, Texas, until 
he conformed to the guidelines of the hair-grooming code, which included 
this statement: 
Hair may be blocked, but is not ro hang over the ears or the 
top of the collar of a standard dress shirt and must not 
obstruct vision. No artificial means to conceal the length 
of the hair is permitted; i.e., ponytails , buns, wigs, combs, 
or straps.30 
The student brought action against Clifford Schmidt, Principal 
of Coronado High School, seeking injunctive relief against enforcement 
of the hair grooming code. Karr claimed that enforcement of the grooming 
code violated equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
while school officials asserted the code necessary to insure an effective 
educational system by minimizing distractions, disruptions, health and 
safety hazards, and discipline problems. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 
November 19, 1970, established that the classification of male high school 
"^Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728, 732 (1970) . 
Ill 
students on the basis of length of hair was unreasonable and so violated 
the right of equal protection. Enforcement of the haircut . rule created 
more disruption of the classroom educational process than the hair it 
sought to prohibit. The court found no credence in the argument that 
long hair constituted a health hazard to others via lack of cleanliness 
and odors. Female students, reasoned the court, have traditionally kept 
long hair clean. 
Clifford Schmidt appealed to the United States Court of Appeals. 
This fifth circuit court, on April 28, 1972, setting en banc, reversed 
31 the lower district court ruling. Student claims of protection of choice 
of coiffure under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments were 
rejected. 
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari; however, in a 
dissenting opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas argued that state regulation 
32 of hair length raises a serious equal protection question. 
Discussion 
A basic question arising from this case is whether the right to 
wear hair of one's choice is indeed constitutionally protected. The Karr 
decision, reiterating Ferrell, established that enforcement of hair groom­
ing codes did not create constitutional rights infringement. 
The appellate court decision, however, was not unanimous. Con­
sequently, the Karr decision is frequently referred to as "a decision 
OO 
that divided the court." The frequently cited dissenting opinion follows; 
•^Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F. 2d 609 (1972). 
32Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971). 
^^David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, p. 145. 
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Like other elements of costume, hair is a symbol of elegance, 
of efficiency, of affinity and association, of non-conformity 
and rejection of traditional values. A person shorn of the 
freedom to vary the length and style of his hair is forced 
against his will to hold himself out symbolically as a person 
holding ideas contrary, perhaps, to ideas he holds most dear. 
Forced dress, including forced hair style, humiliates the 
unwilling complier, forces him to submerge his individuality 
in the "undistracting" mass, and in general, smacks of the 
exaltation of organization over member, unit component, and 
state over individual,34 
The Karr and Ferrell decisions, favoring the position of school 
authorities, prevailed as the fifth circuit litigated the greatest number 
of hair cases. 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
GFELL v. RICKELMAN 
313 F. Supp. 367 (1970) 
441 F. 2d 444 (1971) 
Facts 
Edward Bruce Gfell was suspended from West Geauga High School, 
Cleveland, Ohip, in December of 1969 for failing to comply with the school 
dress code which contained the following provisions : 
(1) Boys should be clean shaven (no beards or moustaches). 
(2) Hair and sideburns must be clean and well groomed. Side­
burns should be neatly trimmed and should not exceed in 
length to the bottom of the ear and one inch in width. 
(3) The back hair length should not exceed the top of the 
collar (the determining factor being a standard dress 
shirt with the top button open). 
(4) The hair should not cover the ear and should be worn out 
34Ibid., p. 152. 
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of the eyes, thinned to avoid heavy matting and curling 
in the back. 
The student got his hair cut and was readmitted to school later al­
though, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern 
Pistri.ct of Ohio seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that 
the hair-grooming code was unconstitutional. 
Decision 
Dismissing the case, the district court held that enforcement of 
the hair grooming code had reasonable relationship to prevention of safety 
hazards, to maintenance of discipline and order, and to the athletic pro­
gram. ̂  The court heard testimony from other students that fights had 
erupted as a result of long-haired males thus justifying the relation­
ship to maintenance of discipline and order. In its decision, the court 
reasoned that long hair creates a safety hazard in industrial arts courses 
and damages the image of athletic programs. 
The plaintiff student appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the sixth circuit, but this court affirmed the lower court 
decision.37 
Discussion 
Deciding in favor of school authorities, the Gfell court solidi­
fied the judicial attitude of the sixth circuit concerning long hair on 
male students. This case is also significant in the court's contention 
3^Gfell y. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444, 445 (1971). 
36Gfell v. Rickleman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (1970). 
•^Gfell y. Rickelman, 441 F. 2d 444 (1971). 
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that promulgation of the dress code by the student body dispels any contention 
of capriciousness or of arbitrariness. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
ARNOLD v. CARPENTER 
479 F. 2d 939 (1972) 
Facts 
The dress code for Wawasee High School in Syracuse, Indiana was 
developed by a committee of students, teachers, and administrators. Stu­
dent committee members were elected by the student body and the dress code 
was adopted by a majority of the students. This code, in general, sought 
"to insure the best possible overall appearance" of the student body and 
was expressedly intended as a guide for students "where common sense 
fails to be a sufficient code of appearance."^® The long-hair provision 
of the code reads as follows: 
Faces must be clean shaven. Sideburns are not to be longer 
than one inch from the bottom of the ear lobe and must not be 
more than two inches wide at the bottom. 
If any student feels that it is absolutely necessary for him 
to present an appearance other than this, he may do so only under 
the following conditions: the parent or legal guardian must sign 
before (in the presence of) the principal or designated admin­
istrator a statement each school year which identifies the desired 
deviation from the accepted dress code and which signifies the 
willingness of the parent or legal guardian to authorize his 
youngster to present an appearance other than the dress code 
recommendations 
Under the code an offending student was punished by separating 
him from classmates, assigning him to a different room and depriving him 
of any classroom participation until he adhered to the code. 
^Arnold v. Carpenter, 479 F. 2d 939, 940 (1972). 
39Ibid., p. 940. 
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At the beginning of the 1970 school year, the parents of four 
students, including Greg Carpenter, refused to consent, thus the code 
penalty was imposed. 
The students' parents filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Indiana seeking injunctive relief 
from enforcement of the hair grooming code. 
Decision 
The United States District Court granted injunctive relief; how­
ever, Don H. Arnold, Superintendent, appealed. On April 25, 1972, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit, affirmed the 
40 
district court decision. The Court of Appeals argued that enforcement 
of the hair code infringed on Greg Carpenter's right to due process guar­
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Discussion 
This case posed, as Gfell had in the sixth circuit, the question 
of whether a grooming, code should be upheld if elected students partici­
pate in its formulation and if it is democratically approved by a student 
majority. The case also questioned the rationale of a code that allows 
for exceptions based on parental request. The appellate court concluded 
that mere student participation in adoption of the code did not justify 
the limitation imposed on the constitutional right to wear long hair. 
Moreover, the court decided that the student's appearance at school with 
long hair was an indication that his parents were agreeable to it. 
^Arnold v. Carpenter, 479 F. 2d (1972). 
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BREEN v. KAHL 
296 F. Supp. 702 (1969) 
419 F. 2d 1034 (1969) 
398 US 937 (1970) 
Facts 
The dress code promulgated by the Williams Bay Board of Education 
in Madison, Wisconsin follows: 
Hair should be washed, combed and worn so it does not hang below 
the collar line in the back, over the ears on the side and must 
be above the eyebrows. Boys should be clean shaven; long side­
burns are out.^l 
Thomas Breen and two other students were expelled in 1968 for 
violation of the grooming code. These students filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against the 
Williams Bay Board of Education, challenging the constitutionality of 
the hair code. 
Decision 
The district court held that the school board members failed to 
carry their burden of justifying the allegation that long-haired male 
students distract fellow students or showing that such students academically 
perform more poorly than conforming students. In ruling for the student, 
the court reasoned that enforcement of the grooming code was violative of 
42 due process. The defendants appealed, but the United States Court of 
Appeals for the seventh circuit on December 3, 1969, affirmed the lower 
court decision.^ certiorari was not granted by the Supreme Court 
^Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 703 (1969). 
^Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (1969). 
43Breen v. Kahl, 419 F. 2d 1034 (1969). 
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ZlA 
of the United States. 
Discussion 
This case is significant, as it addressed the controversy con­
cerning the relationship between poor academic performance and long hair. 
The court found no correlation between these two facets of student per­
sonality. Moreover, the decision indicated that the burden of proof in 
justifying grooming codes lies with school officials. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
BISHOP v. COLAW 
316 F. Supp. 445 (1970) 
450 F. 2d 1069 (1971) 
Facts 
Stephen Bishop, student at Saint Charles High School in Saint 
Charles, Missouri, was suspended for failure to comply with the dress code 
relating to hair. Concerning hair length, the code stipulated: 
All hair is to be worn clean, neatly trimmed around the ears and 
no longer than the top of the collar on a regular dress or sport 
shirt when standing erect. The eyebrows must be visible, and no 
part of the ear can be covered. The hair can be in a block cut. 
The maximum length for sideburns shall be the bottom of the ear 
lobe.« 
Stephen Bishop filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri against Frank Colaw and other members of 
the Board of Education for the Saint Charles School District seeking 
injunctive relief against enforcement of the grooming code and that 
damages be awarded. 
45BishoP v. Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069, 1070, 1071 (1971). 
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Decision 
The district court granted a temporary injunction; however, after 
hearing evidence that long hair caused problems of discipline, safety, 
and cleanliness, and since the student had suffered no damages as a re­
sult of hair code enforcement, the tribunal dissolved the injunction. 
In addition, the court ruled that enforcement of the code and suspension 
of the student did not constitute an invasion of privacy to the extent 
of warranting protection by the United States courts. 
With the plaintiffs' appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the eighth circuit reversed the lower district court decision. The 
Court of Appeals held that the hair-grooming code for male students was 
invalid and unenforceable in situations where the code was not necessary 
for completion of the educational mission.^ 
Discussion 
Ruling in favor of the student, this appellate court decision 
established that the eighth circuit viewed choice of coiffure a right 
protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. The court surmised: 
. . .  a  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  s c h o o l  r e s t r i c t i o n  o n  m a l e  s t u d e n t  h a i r  
styles accomplishes little more than to project the prejudices 
and personal distastes of certain adults in authority on to the 
impressionable young student. It is bromidic to say that times 
change, but perhaps this is a case where a bromide is in order. 
^Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F. 2d 1069 (1971) . 
47Ibid. , p. 1078. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT 
OLFF V. EAST SIDE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 
" 305 F. Supp. 557 (1969) 
445 F. 2d 932 (1971) 
92 S. Ct. 703 (1972) 
Facts 
Robert Olff, a student at James Lick High School, San Jose, Cal­
ifornia, was informed on September 10, 1969 that he would not be permitted 
to attend classes because his hair style violated the following code; 
Hair shall be trim and clean. A boy's hair shall not fall 
below the eyes in front and shall not cover the ears, and 
it shall not extend below the collar in back. 
Olff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis­
trict of California seeking injunctive relief to redress deprivation of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Decision 
The district court decided that where hair code regulations were 
not limited according to circumstances warranting such control, they un­
constitutionally infringed on free expression .^9 East Side Union High 
School District appealed; consequently, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the ninth circuit reversed the lower court decision ruling in favor 
of school officials."*® The Court of Appeals held that considering statutes 
authorizing school boards to establish regulations for day-to-day operation 
of the educational process there was no violation of due process or free 
^®01ff v. East Side Union High School District, 305 F. Supp. 557, 558 
(1969). 
^Olff v. East Side Union High School District, 305 F. Supp. 557 
(1969). 
5001ff v. East Side Union High School District, 445 F. 2d 932 (1971). 
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expression. Once again, the United States Supreme Court refused to grant 
certiorari. 
Discussion 
This case raised the question of whether the Tinker ruling should 
apply in hair decisions. Since there was no evidence that Robert Olff's 
hair led to any disruption, he argued that the Tinker ruling should apply 
to his case. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, sta­
ting that "the attachment of the label 'symbolic speech' to an expression 
does not make it symbolic speech in the absence of circumstances showing 
it to have been so intended. 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
CHRISTMAS v. EL RENO BOARD OF EDUCATION 
~ 313 F. Supp. 618 (1970) 
449 F. 2d 153 (1971) 
Facts 
Gary Christmas was not allowed to participate in a postgraduate 
diploma ceremony at El Reno High School, El Reno, Oklahoma, as punishment 
for violating the hair-grooming code which prohibited male students from 
wearing their hair over the ears, eyes, or collars. The student filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma against the El Reno Board of Education seeking injunctive relief. 
He claimed that enforcement of the grooming code violated the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. 
5101ff v. East Side Union High School District, 92 S. Ct. 703 (1972). 
~^01ff v. East Side Union High School District, 445 F. 2d 932, 937 
(1971). 
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Decision 
The United States District Court on June 4, 1970 decided that 
enforcement of the dress code did not violate any of the plaintiff's con­
stitutional rights and so, denied relief 
Christmas' appeal proved futile, as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the tenth circuit on September 28, 1971 affirmed the district 
54 court ruling. 
Discussion 
In addition to establishing the judicial attitude in favor of 
school authorities in the tenth circuit, this case also asserted that 
supervision of hair styles of male students in state public schools is a 
matter for the states. 
SUMMARY 
The f:rst, second, fourth, seventh, and eighth circuits have 
ruled in favor of the students' choice of hair style. This ruling ten­
dency is reflected in the first circuit's decision that choice of coiffure 
is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The second 
circuit ruled that restrictions on hair styles are more serious invasions 
of individual freedom than are clothing regulations. Fourth eircuit 
rulings suggested administrative tolerance and hair nets but no hair cuts. 
The seventh circuit reasoned that mere student participation in formula­
tion of the dress code does not justify constitutional rights infringement 
on due process, while the eighth circuit viewed choice of hairstyle as 
•^Christmas v. El Reno Board of Education, 313 F, Supp. 618 (1970). 
^Christmas y. El Reno Board of Education, 449 F. 2d 153 (1971). 
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protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
On the other hand, the third, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth cir­
cuits fiaye ruled that controlling male student hair styles is essential 
in the promotion of educational decorum. The third circuit refuted stu­
dents ' claims of protection under the First and Ninth Amendments while 
asserting that hair control is strictly a matter for the states. Recog­
nizing that even if the right to wear long hair is constitutionally pro­
tected, the fifth circuit determined that infringement on that right is 
justified in the presence of a compelling state reason. Student parti­
cipation in the formulation of the dress code dispels any contention of 
arbitrariness: this was the opinion of the sixth circuit. The Tinker 
decision, an historical precedent in hair grooming cases, was rejected 
as applicable by the ninth and tenth circuits on the basis that such 
matters fall under state jurisdiction. 
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Chapter V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Intensification of the struggle to achieve constitutional rights 
for students has taken a variety of forms including confrontations, court 
decisions, and the passage of legislation designed to assure the pro­
tection of these rights. Dissension of youth and young adults, demon­
strations against the status quo, and the search for new values have 
troubled many older people, thus creating much discussion concerning the 
"generation gap". One of the most prominent sources of difference be­
tween the two generations has emanated from contrasting views on dress 
and grooming, especially hair styles. Despite the opinion that hair 
style is, in theory, a matter of personal choice, there has been ex­
tensive litigation since many school boards and administrators deem 
"extreme" or "eccentric" hair styles among students educationally dis­
ruptive . 
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century, however, 
that the federal courts began to recognize that educational policies 
were sometimes inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements. 
The Gault decision in 1967 represents the beginning of court application 
of constitutional protection to pupils in public educational institu­
tions. Since then at least seven thousand federal court cases which 
have affected the organization, administration and programs of public 
schools have been litigated. 
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The area of students' rights yielded the greatest number of 
court litigation in the late 1960's and 1970's. At least one hundred 
and fifteen male hair style cases have been litigated by state and 
federal courts since 1965. Federal courts, representing the variant 
social and geographical philosophies, could not agree on a solution 
to the controversy arising from the enforcement of hair-grooming codes 
for male students in public schools of the United States. 
This historical study reviewed court decisions from the United 
States Courts of Appeals, United States District Courts, and various 
state courts in an attempt to identify constitutional protection for the 
choice of hair style and to identify the reasons given by local school 
boards for controlling the length of male students' hair. The study 
also presented an analysis of selected court cases dealing with the 
length of hair on male students. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on a review of the literature and an analysis of the legal 
proceedings reviewed in this study, the following conclusions are presented: 
(1) The first, second, fourth, seventh, and eighth judicial 
circuits have established that choice of hairstyle is constitutionally 
protected under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The third, fifth, sixth, ninth, and tenth circuits have 
supported claims that long hair on male students is unhealthy, unsanitary, 
or educationally disruptive. 
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(2) School boards and administrators are not immune from lia­
bility for money damages in cases involving the infringement on consti­
tutional rights due to enforcement of hair dress codes. 
(3) Local school boards and administrators must be prepared to 
establish a need for its dress code. 
(4) School boards must be prepared to factually substantiate 
the contention that long hair creates a health and safety hazard. 
(5) School boards must be prepared to present factual evidence 
in support of their contention that long hair on male students is educa­
tionally disruptive. As determined in Tinker the mere fear that the 
wearing of black armbands would result in disruption was insufficient to 
justify the school board's efforts to ban the wearing of symbols. There­
fore, if evidence exists that long hair on males contributes to school 
disruption, it can only be used after the fact. 
(6) School boards must be able to justify claims that long 
hair on male students creates discipline and morale problems. 
(7) Provisions for suspension or expulsion must be included 
provided this is punishment for violating the grooming code. 
(a) Reasons must be given in advance in writing. 
(b) Opportunity must be given to the student for 
an open hearing and the presentation of testimony. 
(c) If the student wishes, representation by counsel 
with the right of appeal must be afforded. 
(8) Hair-grooming codes should be cooperatively developed with 
students (making sure the students are representative of the entire stu­
dent body), faculty, and parents. 
(9) Hair-grooming codes must be simple but not too vague and 
subject to revision with a provision for exceptions. 
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(10) Judicial reasoning concerning long hair has established that 
no correlation exists between long hair and poor academic performance. 
(11) Division of the judicial circuits and the district courts 
therein concerning the long-hair issue will stand until the Supreme Court 
of the United States makes a ruling. 
Since students have tirelessly questioned the constitutionality 
of hair-grooming policies, local school boards and administrators must 
be prepared to establish that the dress code is needed. In American 
jurisprudence, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff; however, this 
has not been the case where dress regulations have been responsible for 
suits against school board members. School board members find themselves 
defending dress regulations in court, thus bearing the burden of proof. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCHOOL BOARDS 
AND SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
The legal principles relating to the discretionary control of 
hair style is applicable to almost every phase of pupil appearance. There­
fore, based on the review of the literature and an analysis of court cases, 
the following are some guidelines for school boards and administrators 
in the formulation and implementation of dress codes. 
(1) School boards must be able to justify that a compelling and 
overriding governmental interest is at stake and that the demand for short 
hair on male students is the only method of protection. Judges seek evi­
dence rather than opinions or moral assertions. 
(2) Dress codes should be simple but not vague. Moreover, dress 
codes that are authoritarian or arbitrary are likely to be tested in court. 
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(3) Dress codes must exclude any suggestion that male students 
who wear long hair tend to be effeminate and unmanly since this is not 
a judicially accepted argument. 
(4) Dress codes should be subject to revision with provisions 
for exceptions. For example, the right to wear long hair, when it is 
grown to hide physical abnormalities will probably be judicially pro­
tected . 
(5) Dress codes which include suspension or expulsion as punish­
ment must clearly define due process provisions. 
(6) Dress codes should be cooperatively developed with students, 
faculty, and parents. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The effect of the litigation and the changing values of society 
have certainly had an impact on both the wording and intent of high 
school dress codes. A comparative study of the dress codes in those 
school systems where the hair regulations have been challenged in the 
courts would illustrate the impact of the litigation. The effects of 
decisions supporting the school board and those supporting the students 
could be examined in this study. These changes could then be compared 
with dress codes from school systems where litigation has not occurred. 
The value of a study of this type is the illustration of an area where 
the court system has indirectly become the de facto school policy maker. 
In order to understand more clearly the thinking of the United 
States Supreme Court Justices, an investigative study could be initiated 
to examine closely the reasons for refusing to review a haircut case. 
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Human rights are and have long been championed by the Supreme Court. Does 
the court not view cases of this topic as serious infringement or poten­
tial infringements of this basic constitutional right? 
A third area or issue that seems to have value for future study 
is a review of organizations and institutions other than public schools 
that have enforced hair-length or style restrictions. The military is 
probably the most well known and the most successful in the enforcement 
of strict dress and hair length codes. Certain airlines, some professional 
sports teams, law enforcement teams, and firemen have hair-length codes. 
These organizations have different contingencies to use for enforcement 
of codes—primarily monetary and promotion of discipline. 
Concluding Statement 
Societal acceptance of long hair, beards, and moustaches, rather 
than a definite ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States reduced 
lower court activity concerning long hair, as school authorities became 
more tolerant concerning students' choice of coiffure. The fact exists, 
however, that the issue has not been judicially settled. This continues 
to present a suitable environment in the public schools for testing con­
stitutional rights' issues against governmental interests. 
The decade of the 1980's finds the "weird" movement beginning 
in many of the larger cities."*• This new sensation involves rainbow-
colored hair with heavy makeup and lipstick on males and females. Con­
temporary hair styles for women decorated with braids and beads (the 
Bo Derek style) has already come under scrutiny of employers who suggest 
that this new style is too liberal for professional business standards. 
^"Real People," National Broadcasting Company Television, March 5, 
1980. 
129 
Also, as the gay liberation movement gains momentum, the controversy for 
school boards and administrators is likely to concern the length of male 
students' skirts as well as hair. The controversies of the 1980's 
could be more bizarre than the length of hair on male students. 
Fashion within a society is a changing phenomenon. What does 
not change, however, is the demand that school boards and administrators 
exercise a degree of judgment in their decisions. Both the courts and 
standards of education dictate that disciplinary actions bear some rea­
sonable relation to the educational purpose. To offer less introduces 
the courts into the affairs of educators to a degree that inhibits 
accomplishment of the educational process. 
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